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ABSTRACT 
The U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) are the most highly trained, best equipped, and most 
seasoned soldiers to which the United States can turn to achieve national security 
objectives. The future, however, will require more indirect application of SF, through 
special warfare operations (e.g., UW, FID, etc.), in a host of hostile and undefined areas 
around the globe. This manner of employment is a change in emphasis from the direct 
combat operations that have been the norm over the past decade of war. In order to 
prepare adequately for future indirect operations, SF must change the focus of its 
training. Expertise in non-lethal skills will become an increasing requirement for mission 
success. This research, however, has identified a roadblock to such an endeavor. An 
informal organizational culture has developed in SF that focuses greatly on building the 
lethal skill sets over the non-lethal ones.  
Through analysis of survey data, this research diagnoses the condition of the 
overarching organizational culture of the SF Groups. It also identifies various aspects of 
that culture at the Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA) level, that hinder SF’s ability to 
perform optimally. This study provides recommendations for correcting the shortcomings 
of the current dominant organizational culture to support the indirect method that will 
bring future operational successes.  
 
  vi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT...............................................1 
A. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................1 
B. THE FUTURE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT AND CHANGES 
NECESSARY FOR SUCCESS .......................................................................2 
C. ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE’S ROLE .................................................5 
D. ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE .................................................................7 
1. Evolution of Organizational Culture and Organizational 
Culture Defined ....................................................................................7 
2. Expanding the Concept of Organizational Culture ..........................9 
3. Levels of Organizational Culture .....................................................10 
4. Functions of Organizational Culture and Organizational 
Performance .......................................................................................11 
E. OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS .......................................15 
F. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS .................................................................15 
II. SPECIAL FORCES’ FUTURE AND ASSESSING THE 
ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE FIT....................................................................17 
A. INTRODUCTION: ........................................................................................17 
B. THE PROBLEM EXPANDED .....................................................................17 
1. USSOCOM .........................................................................................17 
2. USASOC .............................................................................................18 
3. Requirements Outlined in Doctrine .................................................20 
C. ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE APPLIED TO SPECIAL FORCES ..22 
1. Levels of Special Forces’ Organizational Culture ..........................22 
2. SF Performance ..................................................................................24 
3. Assessing and Measuring SF’s Organizational Culture .................26 
III. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH .......................................................................................29 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................29 
B. DATA COLLECTION PROCESS ...............................................................30 
1. Respondents ........................................................................................30 
2. Survey Instrument .............................................................................32 
a. Denison Organizational Culture Survey ................................32 
b. Supplemental Questions .........................................................34 
C. SURVEY IMPLEMENTATION AND DATA COLLECTION ................35 
D. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS ........................................35 
1. Denison Organizational Culture Survey ..........................................35 
a. Analysis by Trait and Index ....................................................37 
2. Supplemental Questions ....................................................................43 
a. Future Mission and Direction ................................................43 
b. Training ...................................................................................50 
c. Rewards and Desires ...............................................................85 
E. FINAL THOUGHTS ON EMPIRICS .........................................................88 
  viii 
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...................................................89 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................89 
B. SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL RESULTS ..................................................89 
1. Denison Organizational Culture Survey Results ............................89 
a. Mission ....................................................................................89 
b. Adaptability..............................................................................90 
c. Consistency ..............................................................................91 
d. Involvement .............................................................................91 
2. Supplemental Questionnaire Results ...............................................91 
a. Future Mission and Direction ................................................91 
b. Training ...................................................................................92 
c. Rewards and Desires ...............................................................92 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS ...............................................................................93 
1. Overarching Strategy for Change ....................................................93 
2. Recommendations to Address SF’s Culture at the Group Level ..94 
a. Communicate Effectively ........................................................94 
b. Encourage Long-Term Cultural Change...............................95 
c. Mentor, Educate, and Cast a Wide Net ..................................96 
3. Recommendations Specific to ODAs Building Necessary 
Skillsets................................................................................................97 
a. Operational Detachment Bravo (ODB) Responsibilities .......97 
b. Collective Training ..................................................................98 
4. Recommendations for Further Research .........................................99 
D. FINAL THOUGHTS ...................................................................................100 
APPENDIX A. DENISON ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE SURVEY ......................103 
APPENDIX B. SUPPLEMENTAL QUESTIONS ............................................................105 
LIST OF REFERENCES ....................................................................................................119 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .......................................................................................123 
 
  
  ix 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. USASOC Force Missions (from USASOC, 2013) ..........................................18 
Figure 2. Levels of Culture (after Schein, 1995) .............................................................23 
Figure 3. Research Method and Purpose .........................................................................27 
Figure 4. Distribution of Ranks Surveyed .......................................................................30 
Figure 5. Traits and Indices Based on the Denison Model of High Performance 
Circumplex (from Denison et al., 2012) ..........................................................32 
Figure 6. Denison Organizational Culture Survey (DOCS) Results Special Forces 
Regiment (from Denison Consulting, 2014) ....................................................36 
Figure 7. DOCS Results of Adaptability Trait (from Denison Consulting, 2014) ..........37 
Figure 8. DOCS Results of Mission Trait (from Denison Consulting, 2014) .................38 
Figure 9. DOCS Results of Consistency Trait (from Denison Consulting, 2014) ..........40 
Figure 10. DOCS Results of Involvement Trait (from Denison Consulting, 2014) .........41 
Figure 11. Perception of BN or SFG Change in Mission Focus .......................................44 
Figure 12. Future Mission and Direction: Should SF Conduct More Direct or Indirect 
Operations? ......................................................................................................46 
Figure 13. Future Mission and Direction: Percentage of ODA Motivated to Join SF to 
Conduct DA Operations? .................................................................................48 
Figure 14. Time Devoted to Training Tasks .....................................................................51 
Figure 15. Training: The Training Area Respondents Believed Needed the Most 
Emphasis for Success in Future Missions ........................................................55 
Figure 16. Training Tasks Chosen for Four Deployment Scenarios .................................58 
Figure 17. Rewards and Desires: Number of Months/Yr Subjects Would Like to 
Deploy to Train Foreign Partners ....................................................................86 
 
  x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  xi 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ADP Army Doctrine Publication 
ARSOF Army Special Operations Forces 
ATP Army Doctrine and Training Publication 
BN battalion 
COIN counterinsurgency operations 
CONOP concept of operations 
DOCS Denison Organizational Culture Survey 
DOD Department of Defense 
FID foreign internal defense 
FM field manual 
LTG  lieutenant general 
NCO non-commissioned officer 
ODA(s) Operational Detachment(s)-Alpha 
ODB(s) Operational Detachment(s)-Bravo 
SF Special Forces 
SFAS Special Forces Assessment and Selection 
SFG(s) Special Forces Group(s) 
SOF Special Operations Forces 
SW Special Warfare 
USASOC United States Army Special Operations Command 
USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command 
UW unconventional warfare 
  
  xii 
 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
  1 
I. INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION  
U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) are America’s premier fighting force; selected, 
trained, and experienced in the attributes and skills that the United States requires to 
defeat her asymmetric, unorthodox, and adaptable foes. Over the previous decade of 
employment, SF has done just that in various parts of the world.  
However, for more than a decade SF has, for the most part, been used in a largely 
direct manner to support counterinsurgency operations (COIN) in combat, particularly in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. Senior Department of Defense (DOD) and Special Operations 
Forces (SOF) leaders have identified that the future operating environment will be vastly 
different than in the recent past. This fact will require strategic shifts of mission focus, 
requiring SF to be used in a more indirect manner; conducting more “special warfare” 
(SW) activities such as foreign internal defense (FID), unconventional warfare (UW) and 
the building of a Global SOF Network.  
Additionally, changes will be made in how SF trains and operates in order to 
properly prepare to maintain pressure on the enemies of America and to ensure greater 
success in achieving our national security requirements. This shift in mission and training 
focus, in accordance with a shift in strategy, requires Special Forces Groups (SFGs) to 
train on less kinetic, or lethal, skills and focus on non-lethal, or “soft,” skills such as 
foreign language proficiency, cultural awareness, political awareness, and network 
building.  
This research assesses the degree to which such a shift in focus is attainable. More 
specifically, this work analyzes whether informal organizational culture has developed in 
the Special Forces Groups that places too great an emphasis on preparing for kinetic 
operations performed in a more direct manner. If so, such an organizational culture may 
run contrary to the goals of SF as a whole and would not be suited to promote the SFGs’ 
ability to gain/maintain the skills necessary to be successful in future asymmetric, 
uncertain environments.  
  2 
The results of the empirical research conducted in this study suggest that the 
current organizational culture of SF hinders, to some degree, its ability to acquire or build 
the skills and attributes necessary to achieve optimal levels of performance in future 
indirect application. SF’s cultural strength lies in its empowerment of the Operational 
Detachments-Alpha (ODAs), however the ODAs are not operating in a fashion that ties 
their actions into an overarching strategy for success. This summation will be expanded 
upon in Chapters III and IV.  
The remainder of this chapter will discuss the changing role of SF, given the 
United States Special Operations Command’s (USSOCOM) and the United States Army 
Special Operations Command’s (USASOC) assessment of the future operating 
environment. Next, I will highlight the need to align SF’s organizational culture with its 
changing missions and environment as a necessary condition for success. I will then 
conceptualize and expand on the concept of organizational culture and its relation to 
organizational performance. I will follow with the research purpose and design and 
conclude with a roadmap for the remainder of the study.    
B. THE FUTURE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT AND CHANGES 
NECESSARY FOR SUCCESS 
In the foreword to the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) 
Operating Concept for 2020, Admiral William H. McRaven, USSOCOM Commander, 
writes that in the “first decade of the 21st Century…SOF primarily supported large-scale 
contingency operations by conducting counterterrorism operations to find, capture, or kill 
our adversaries” (USSOCOM, 2013, p. 1). However, USSOCOM outlines several ways 
in which the future operating environment is changing. It discusses the role that non-state 
actors, demographic shifts, redistribution and diffusion of global power, globalization, 
advanced technologies, and enduring conflicts will play on the strategic environment, 
highlighting that these changes ensure that “uncertain, complex and volatile trends [will] 
exist” (USSOCOM, 2013, p. 2). In order to address these changes to the environment, 
USSOCOM says SOF will: 
conduct core activities with a focused, balanced approach through small-
footprint distributed operations to understand and influence relevant 
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populations. USSOCOM optimizes and exploits the Global SOF Network 
to provide strategic options for National Leadership in support of U.S. 
Government efforts to enhance stability, prevent conflicts, and when 
necessary, fight and defeat adversaries. (USSOCOM, 2013, p. 3)  
USSOCOM has several key elements of this strategy: Chief among them is 
emphasis on enduring small-footprint operations within the human terrain to build 
sustainable partner capacity and increase the Global SOF Network. SOF will accomplish 
these operational approaches, in part, by developing their expertise on regional issues and 
cultures (USSOCOM, 2013).  
USSOCOM provides this guidance to all SOF, many of which do not have a long 
history of working by, with, and through the human domain. This would lead many to 
argue that the members of U.S. Army SF are already skilled in these tasks. However, the 
United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) guidance presented in the 
Army Special Operations Forces 2022 (ARSOF 2022) blueprint, suggests ARSOF needs 
to focus on several changes as well to achieve USSOCOM’s, DOD’s and its own goals.  
ARSOF 2022 begins by describing a future operational environment 
characterized, primarily, by uncertainty: “Future threats will range from standing 
conventional and unconventional forces to irregular militias and paramilitaries to terrorist 
groups, criminal elements and any number of hybrids” (ARSOF 2022, 2013, p. 4). In 
order to be prepared for employment in this uncertain environment, ARSOF 2022 states 
ARSOF must “provide joint-force commanders scalable nodes, with unmatched levels of 
tactical skill and language and cultural expertise, which establish persistent and 
distributed networks that provide the nation precise and nuanced asymmetric capability” 
(ARSOF 2022, 2013, p. 9).  
One way in which ARSOF will accomplish this will be to successfully apply its 
forces in an indirect manner. USASOC explains that the term “indirect” is a previous 
attempt to describe what it calls “special warfare” (SW). Special warfare is, “the 
execution of activities that involve a combination of lethal and non-lethal actions taken 
by specially trained and educated forces that have a deep understanding of cultures and 
foreign language, proficiency in small-unit tactics, subversion, sabotage and the ability to 
  4 
build and fight alongside indigenous combat formations in a permissive, uncertain, or 
hostile environment” (ARSOF 2022, 2013, p. 10). Special warfare is an umbrella term 
covering FID, UW, and COIN operations. Chapter II will discuss many of the critical 
gaps and capabilities that require focus for ARSOF to accomplish missions in the conduct 
of special warfare operations.  
Many writers and experts on military affairs agree with the assessments of 
USSOCOM and USASOC. Nelson and Wise write for the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies. They recognize that SOF’s traditional competencies in indirect 
operations will be highly demanded in the future. However, they state, “Due to constant 
operations in Title 10 combat zones where the U.S. military has the lead, such as Iraq and 
Afghanistan, SOF’s traditional proficiency in conducting indirect action on a global scale 
has atrophied” (2012, p. 76). They also note that over 80 percent of SOF personnel have 
been focused on operations in the Middle East and therefore, much of the regional 
expertise of these units has diminished as well (Nelson & Wise, 2012). However, these 
two authors recognize that SOF leaders understand the issues and are working to correct 
deficiencies in order to be prepared for future employment in indirect manners (Nelson & 
Wise, 2012).  
Linda Robinson, a reporter with inside access to USSOCOM has stated, “It is 
time for special operations forces to prioritize indirect operations” (Robinson, 2012, p. 2) 
However she warns that in order to do this, “the special operations community will need 
to reconfigure itself to execute [indirect operations] more skillfully” (Robinson, 2012, 
p. 2). 
The common thread from USSOCOM, USASOC, and noted military historians 
and journalists is that SF will be called upon, more than ever, to conduct a range of 
military operations throughout an ever-changing, uncertain environment that is both 
global in spread and volatile in nature. In order to be prepared to operate in these 
environments, SF will have to be proficient in skills that make them easily adaptable to 
their changing environments and operate effectively in the “human terrain” during 
indirect operations.  
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C. ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE’S ROLE 
The constant rotation into combat operations and the need to prepare SF units to 
conduct direct actions necessary for success in the manner of which SF was employed 
required that the SF groups trained certain skills over others. Those skills were trained 
and rewarded based on good or poor performance accordingly. Those skills were also 
tested in combat due to the direct manner in which SF was utilized and again, 
performance was evaluated and rewarded. The cycle of training, evaluating, applying, 
and evaluating, has advanced an organizational culture that promotes the use of SF in a 
more direct manner. SF, however, is designed to operate in an opposite manner. Its 
strength lies in its ability to operate in an indirect manner to achieve strategic utility. The 
statements above from SOF leaders illustrates their understanding that SF has been used 
more directly for over a decade of war and though such application was necessary 
previously, the future requires more indirect operations. It follows that an informal 
culture was established to match the direct utilization of forces, however in the future, 
that culture may be a mismatch if command elements are eager to change course and start 
using SF in a more indirect and irregular manner. 
To this end, commanders at all levels have begun focusing SF ODAs’ training on 
the skills listed above. However, during informal discussions with former colleagues, 
teammates and commanders, it seems, though emphasis and external motivation are 
provided extremely well by commanders, and to some degree peers, many SF soldiers are 
not intrinsically motivated to really strive for excellence in the “soft” skills.  
Lamb points out in his statement before the House Armed Services Committee’s 
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities in July, 2012, that  
many SOF recruits joined the force specifically in order to participate in 
[direct action, counter-terror] operations. In fact, some SOF experts have 
argued that the allure of direct action has helped fill depleted SOF ranks 
and that the recruits are disappointed when assigned to units that 
traditionally focus more on the indirect approach. (Lamb, 2012, p. 15) 
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He adds that, “USSOCOM will be challenged to reorient Special Forces and other 
SOF units that historically specialize in indirect approaches to ensure they are well 
prepared to actually operate this way” (Lamb, 2012, p. 15).  
LTG Cleveland understands this point and stresses his concern that changes in 
training focus must be made in order to achieve future mission success. At the conclusion 
of ARSOF 2022 LTG Cleveland stresses that “it is imperative that our entire force 
inculcates these changes into the way they do business…it is in your hands” (ARSOF 
2022, 2013, p. 14).  
While many would argue that SF performance is driven by strong leadership, 
military discipline, and the will of operators to execute any given task, organizational 
culture can either align with organizational goals or serve as a hindrance. A formal 
definition of organizational culture follows in this chapter, however, essentially, 
organizational culture may be described as “how we do things around here” and is the 
internalization of widely-shared norms, values, beliefs and assumptions within an 
organization that give meaning to tasks, provide internal motivation to do those tasks, and 
provide the strength to overcome challenges.  
Mobey, Wang and Fang discuss the importance of organizational culture in 
relation to an organization’s ability to reach their goals:  
Bureaucratic control could only buy employees bodies but not their hearts. 
A strong organizational culture, however, can be a primary generator of 
real motivation and commitment. In a strong and cohesive [organizational] 
culture, the organization’s core values are both intensely held and widely 
shared. This high intensity of common beliefs makes it relatively easier to 
draw consensus among employees, to build a focus on important goals and 
objectives, to reduce potential conflicts, to cultivate a learning 
environment, and to lower staff turnover (2005, p. 12).  
Assuming this point is valid, it follows that for SF to reach its goal of effective 
employment of missions under the SW or indirect umbrella, the SFGs’ organizational 
cultures must adapt to facilitate motivated, focused training on the necessary skill sets 
required for SF soldiers to be successful in the uncertain environments of the future. To 
illustrate this point, Rothstein writes about Special Forces and the UW mission. He states 
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that even the single mission of, “UW needs a separate and different organizational 
culture” (Rothstein, 2006, p. 163). 
D. ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE 
1. Evolution of Organizational Culture and Organizational Culture 
Defined 
In business, organizational culture has been studied and theorized under many 
names since the 1930s. In 1938, Chester Bernard wrote about how organizations that 
inculcate the feelings, fundamental attitudes, and loyalties of its members would garner 
more individual interest, which would be to great benefit of the organization as a whole. 
(Wilson, 1989). Other organizational researchers have described what is now known as 
“organizational culture” in many ways, called it many things, and determined its effect on 
performance to many different degrees.  
However, as “organizational culture” gained popularity in the 1980s and 1990s, it 
moved from a disorganized theory to practice amongst corporations. Its popularity 
amongst business leaders grew because those leaders wanted to increase profit and 
organizational theorists had shown the strong link between positive, strong organizational 
cultures and improved effectiveness and performance.  
As the study of organizational culture matured and became more developed, 
however, several theorists defined the term “organizational culture” in their own way. 
This led to difficulty in study and implementation of cultural measurement and change. 
What follows is a minute list of varying definitions, which may seem vastly different, 
however, their commonality lies in the fact that they incorporate ideas or concepts that 
are “shared or held in common” by the members of the organization (Schein, 1992, p. 8).  
 “An internal consistency that shapes behavior, values, and patterns of how 
people think, act, and speak….’the way we do things around here’…a 
certain style that provides social energy” (Jennings, 1986, p. 5) 
 “The set of important understandings (often unstated) that members of a 
community share in common: (Sathe, 1985, p. 6)  
 “…social interaction and interpretation, as revealed in the behavior they 
shape” (Schall, 1983, p. 3).  
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 [Culture is] a set of understandings or meanings shared by a group of 
people. The meanings are largely tacit among the members, are clearly 
relevant to a particular group, and are distinctive to the group” (Louis, 
1985, p. 74).  
Since, it seems, each organizational culture researcher has their own definition of 
“organizational culture,” some scholars argue that it is less important to define 
organizational culture than it is to examine how it is actually operationalized (Martin, 
2002). However a definition is of crucial importance in order to have the basis for 
understanding what “organizational culture” actually is before one can understand how it 
influences an organization’s performance and how it can be managed.  
Therefore, the two published definitions that best fit this study of Special Forces’ 
organizational culture are a conglomerate of the following two: 
A pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group has learned as it 
solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration that has 
worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to 
new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to 
those problems. (Schein, p. 12) 
[Culture is] the pattern of shared beliefs and values that give members of 
an institution meaning, and provide them with the rules for behavior in 
their organization. (Davis, 1984, p. 1)  
Building on these works, therefore, I will define organizational culture as: shared 
basic values, beliefs, and assumptions that a group has learned as its solved problems 
brought about by changes in the external environment and internal integration, that has 
worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members 
of the organization that provide them with the rules for behavior and provide direction 
and motivation for how to perceive, think, and feel and act in relation to those problems.  
The above definition was chosen because it is easily relatable to the Special 
Forces’ organizational culture at the ODA level and its measured impact on the SF 
Regiments’ missions, objectives and goals. I now proceed to expand this concept of 
organizational culture into its component parts for analysis.  
  9 
2. Expanding the Concept of Organizational Culture 
Organizational culture, in simple terms, can be explained as “what we do around 
here” and by the old ethical mantra, “doing what’s right even when no one is looking.” 
Wilson (1989) states, “Every organization has a culture, that is, a persistent way of 
thinking about the central tasks of and human relationships within an organization” 
(Wilson, 1989, p. 91).  
Schein (1997) argues that organization’s cultures are an accumulation of a 
group’s learning as it pertains to behavioral, emotional, and cognitive elements of the 
group’s total psychological functioning. He adds that for this shared learning to occur, 
there must be shared experiences amongst members of the group in relation to how they 
have solved two categories of problems: 1) survival, growth, and adaptation to their 
environment, and 2) internal integration that permits daily functioning and the ability to 
adapt.  
Organizational culture, according to Cameron and Quinn,  
encompasses the taken-for-granted values, underlying assumptions, 
expectations, collective memories, and definitions present in an 
organization…it reflects the prevailing ideology that people carry inside 
their heads. It conveys a sense of identity to employees, provides 
unwritten and often unspoken guidelines for how to get along in the 
organization, and it enhances the stability of the social system that they 
experience. (2006, p. 16).  
Organizational culture, therefore, is an informal, shared accumulation of 
experiences and responses to situations that have occurred over and over again. In that 
accumulation of experiences are tried-and-tested approaches to dealing with situations 
that become second nature to employees in an organization. It encompasses the beliefs, 
values, norms, attitudes, perceptions, and actions that govern how employees will act, 
deal with adversity, conduct interpersonal relations and get the job done. Culture is the 
autopilot that employees switch on the moment they arrive at work. While they may 
make minor course corrections based on changes to the environment, the “autopilot” 
stays engaged.  
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Some aspects of organizational culture can easily be seen by an observer and 
some cannot: “Manifestations of culture include rituals, stories, humor, jargon, physical 
arrangements, and formal structures and policies, as well as informal norms and 
practices” (Martin, 2002, p. 55). However, as Schein argues, there are also deeper layers 
in an organization’s culture that may not be as observable.  
3. Levels of Organizational Culture 
Schein’s concept of organizational culture analyzes culture at several “levels.” 
The term “levels” refers “to the degree to which the cultural phenomenon is visible to the 
observer” (1997, p. 16). The three levels of observation are artifacts, espoused values, 
and basic underlying assumptions.  
Artifacts are the tangible aspects of an organization’s culture. They can be seen, 
heard, felt, and witnessed easily. Items such as building infrastructure, layout of work 
spaces, uniforms and accoutrements, professional language, military customs and 
courtesies, rituals and ceremonies, etc. Schein warns, however, that though this level of 
culture is easy to observe it is often vary hard to decipher and understand.  
However, Schein notes that one may test insights into artifacts only if one has 
experienced the culture at the very level at which the values and assumptions are being 
observed.  
Espoused values are those stated values that attempt to portray the reason for the 
organization’s actions and provide rules and direction to guide the conduct of its 
employees. It is how an organization represents itself to its members and the public.  
Espoused values therefore are often in line with the organization’s mission and 
are used by the organization as a standard for behavior, or, to use a military term, 
standard operating procedures. They are important in that they ensure employees follow 
the value system of the organization rather than their own value systems.  
Basic assumptions are solutions for problems that have become so common place 
that they are taken for granted and rarely, if ever, questioned or examined. The basic 
assumptions within an organization are so deeply rooted, and therefore never debated or 
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confronted, which makes any hint at changing them deeply frustrating and stressful for 
the members of the organization. Since changing these assumptions require great anxiety, 
Schein argues that organizations will, “tend to want to perceive the events around us as 
congruent with our assumptions, even if that means distorting, denying, projecting, or in 
other ways falsifying to ourselves what may be going on around us” (1997, p. 22). This 
creates a catastrophic dilemma, as basic assumptions are the most important aspect of an 
organization’s culture; the primary driver of decisions and the most influential factor in 
determining what actions to take to reach the organization’s goals.  
As the true nature of an organization’s culture lies in its basic assumptions, 
understanding those are a crucial first step in analyzing the overall organizational culture. 
Once the basic assumptions are understood, a researcher can then interpret artifacts 
correctly and more easily understand the values. This research will further elaborate on 
these levels and their relationship to SF’s organizational culture in the following chapter. 
However, it is important to note that much of what the analysis of empirical data 
collected will uncover concern the underlying assumptions that drive SF’s organizational 
culture. A comprehension of the artifacts, values, and assumptions of SF’s culture will 
lead to an overall understanding of the organizational culture. This knowledge will shape 
a determination of what changes are necessary in order to create a culture that better 
encourages desired behaviors and promotes greater degrees of performance.  
4. Functions of Organizational Culture and Organizational Performance 
Just as “organizational culture” has various definitions by scholars and theorists, 
so too are there numerous ideas about what good (or bad) it does for an organization. 
However, a majority of the literature describes organizational culture as having a direct 
effect on an organization’s effectiveness and performance.  
The following section discusses the relationship between organizational culture 
and the effects it has on an organization’s internal work processes as well as an 
organization’s performance. This information is foundational to this study. It provides an  
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understanding of how and why the organizational culture of SF plays a significant role in 
shaping how the unit operates and is a major factor in supporting high degrees of military 
performance.  
According to Wagner and Hollenbeck, organizational culture serves four basic 
functions that make it “a sort of social glue” that reinforces actions, attitudes, and 
behaviors at work:  
It gives members an organizational identity. Sharing norms, values, and 
perceptions gives people a sense of togetherness that helps promote a 
feeling of common purpose.  
It facilitates collective commitment. The common purpose that grows out 
of a shared culture tends to elicit strong commitment from all those who 
accept the culture as their own.  
It promotes system stability. By encouraging a shared sense of identity and 
commitment, culture encourages lasting integration and cooperation 
among the members of an organization.  
It shapes behavior by helping members make sense of their surroundings. 
An organization’s culture serves as a source of shared meanings that 
explain why things occur the way they do. (Wagner & Hollenbeck, 1992, 
p. 695)  
These four functions that organizational culture fulfill, play a major role in 
motivation and direction in the absence of supervision, so that what employees do and 
how they do it, if consistent with the organizational culture, will be in line with the goals 
of the organization.  
Organizational culture, when widely shared and endorsed by employees and 
managers alike, confers a feeling of special worth to the members of the organization, 
provides a basis for recruiting and socializing new members, and allows administrators to 
economize the use of other incentives (Wilson, 1989).  
A strongly supported, widely shared organizational culture, or what Wilson calls a 
“sense of mission” will ensure that employees will not always have to be told what to do, 
but rather they will instinctively know what to do, why it is important, and be motivated 
to do what needs to be done (1989).  
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Sims points out that an organization’s culture that has consensus amongst the 
organization’s members will help its members develop a sense of identity with the 
organization and its direction, mission, and goals. Additionally, employees will agree 
about how results are measured and how rewards and sanctions will be levied for good or 
poor performance. Organizational culture will define the boundaries of groups and 
provide inclusion criteria for membership in the groups, define rules for power and social 
structure, and define the nature and quality of both peer relationships and interpersonal 
interactions. A strong organizational culture will help integrate subsystems, subgroups, 
and processes to allow the organization to coordinate its various functions and divisions 
effectively. Organizational culture will also develop and communicate the organization’s 
ideology which, according to Sims, can be a strong and sometimes overwhelming, guide 
to action. Lastly, Sims argues, that “an organizational culture that gives its members a 
clear vision of the organization’s mission also presents a consistent image to its markets, 
customers, and clients” (Sims, 2002, pp. 304–305).  
As discussed previously, organizational culture is believed by most theorists and 
practitioners to have a strong link to the organization’s performance. Denison et al. points 
out that research since the 1980s has shown that organizational culture impacts 
performance in four main ways:  
 Creating an organization’s sense of mission and direction that allows them 
to define organizational goals and strategies and to create a compelling 
vision of the organization’s future.  
 Building a high level of adaptability and flexibility to easily translate the 
demands of the organizational environment into action.  
 Nurturing the involvement and engagement of their people to ensure a 
highly committed workforce with a sense of ownership and input into 
decisions that affect their work.  
 Providing a consistency that is strongly rooted in a set of core values so 
that highly committed employees with a distinct method of doing business 
will be a powerful source of stability and internal integration.  
  14 
Denison et al. argue that there exists an undeniable link between these four 
impacts of organizational culture and performance measures such as profitability, sales 
growth, quality, innovation, and market value (2012).  
A strong organizational culture, however, is not always an organization’s 
strongest asset. An organization’s culture can either promote new strategies to attain 
goals or they can hinder them. An organization may change the goals they want to 
achieve, change the strategy to reach those goals, or change the way they prepare to enact 
their strategies, however, if they do not address the issue of culture (and its underlying 
effects on performance) that culture will act as a heavy anchor, preventing the 
organization from any real, long-term change or progress. Cameron and Quinn express 
this point saying, when an organization reengineers itself, if it does not fundamentally 
change its organizational culture,  
there is little hope of enduring improvement in organizational 
performance…This dependence of organizational improvement on culture 
change is due to the fact that when the values, orientations, definitions and 
goals stay constant…organizations return quickly to the status 
quo…without an alteration of the fundamental goals, values, and 
expectations of organizations or individuals, change remains superficial 
and of short duration. (2006, p. 11)  
Sims seconds this notion, pointing out that  
changes in an organization’s external environment often require changes 
in an organization’s strategy. The existing organizational culture, though, 
has developed from a particular strategy, and members of the organization 
who are accustomed to that culture may resist changing the strategy. They 
may feel that such change will require changes in existing values and basic 
assumptions. (2002, p. 305)  
This resistance to change can, undoubtedly, prevent any meaningful, and long-
lasting, positive change for the betterment of the organization and its prospects of 
achieving its goals. As SF changes its strategy and mission focus and prepares for more 
indirect operations in uncertain and hostile future operating environments it may be 
postulated that the organizational culture must adapt as well. If the organizational culture 
does not change, it may retard the progress necessary to foster future success.  
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E. OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The purpose of this study is to provide the U.S. Army Special Forces Regiment 
with pilot research into the condition of its organizational culture. For the purpose of this 
study the term “SF Regiment” will be used and will apply only to the five active-duty 
SFGs. Additionally this research will identify various aspects of that organizational 
culture at the ODA level which may hinder the organization’s ability to build the skills 
necessary to succeed in conducting indirect operations in the future operating 
environment. This research is based on a less than fully representative cluster sample of 
SF soldiers; however interpretations can be drawn from the empirical data that will help 
determine the strengths, weaknesses, and orientation of the Regiments’ organizational 
culture. Given this deficiency, this research will also propose recommendations for 
further research to confirm or deny the findings herein. Additionally, recommendations 
will be presented for ways to improve the current organizational culture in order to foster 
a higher degree of performance from Special Forces. 
Special Forces Groups are currently adapting to the changes in the external 
operating environment that require changes in mission focus and training direction. Is the 
organizational culture of SF adapting to support the change in mission focus and future 
indirect utilization of forces? 
 Research Question 1: What is the condition of the Special Forces 
Regiment’s organizational culture currently?  
 Research Question 2: What are some of the aspects of the Regiment’s 
organizational culture that may prove a hindrance to mission 
accomplishment during indirect employment in future uncertain 
environments?  
 Research Question 3: How can the SF Regiment implement approaches 
identified from organizational culture literature to improve the 
organizational cultures of the SFGs in order to foster a culture that 
supports the goals of the Regiment?  
F. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis begins with the statement of the problem, a description of the concept 
of organizational culture and its role in organizational performance (Chapter I). Chapter 
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II expands upon SF’s changing environment, the associated changes in strategy and goals 
and necessary changes in training. Additionally, Chapter II discusses the role SF’s 
organizational culture plays in its organizational performance. Chapter II concludes with 
the methodology of gathering empirical data to determine answers to the research 
questions above. Chapter III displays the results and analysis of the data gathered. 
Chapter IV provides a summary of findings, presents recommendations for further 
research and recommendations for action that will improve the organizational culture of 
the Regiment.  
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II. SPECIAL FORCES’ FUTURE AND ASSESSING THE 
ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE FIT  
A. INTRODUCTION: 
U.S. Army Special Forces are currently transitioning from being utilized in a 
mainly direct manner to more of an indirect role: conducting FID and Partner Nation 
Capacity Building throughout the globe. However, for over a decade, SF has grown 
accustomed to conducting the business of war in a kinetic manner and may have created 
an informal organizational culture to help the Groups adapt to and survive the external 
environmental challenges brought about by such application. When an organization’s 
mission or strategy changes, however, organizational culture can either have a positive 
effect on the organization; promoting the required changes and achieving the new goals, 
or a negative effect; preventing the organization from taking the crucial steps required to 
meet the goals. It is useful therefore, to assess and measure the organizational culture and 
determine if cultural change is necessary in order to facilitate mission success. 
This chapter will expand on the guidance for future SF employment as outlined 
by higher headquarters and discuss more in depth the relationship between SF’s 
organizational culture and the skills necessary to prepare for the future operating 
environment.  
B. THE PROBLEM EXPANDED 
1. USSOCOM 
As Chapter I outlines, the SF Regiment is currently undergoing a change in 
mission focus. What follows is an expansion of USSOCOM and USASOC visions, 
strategies, and goals SF will enact to ensure the Regiment promotes national security 
through its operations across the globe.  
USSOCOM has six key elements of this strategy: Understanding the human 
domain, understanding and influencing the narrative, enduring engagement through 
small-footprint distributed operations, building sustainable partner capacity and 
interoperability, managing the network, and building resilience into the force and families 
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(USSOCOM, 2013). These operational approaches will be enabled by developing SOF 
forces’ ability to gain and maintain certain capabilities. SOF will sustain the Global SOF 
Network, be cultural and regional experts, improve the information environment, conduct 
reduced-signature operations, expand authorities, enhance the capability of SOF enablers, 
and utilize advanced technologies (USSOCOM, 2013).  
 
Figure 1.  USASOC Force Missions (from USASOC, 2013) 
2. USASOC 
As a subordinate unit of USSOCOM, USASOC has also presented a way forward 
for U.S. Army Special Operations Forces. In ARSOF 2022, LTG Cleveland, the 
USASOC Commander, states his vision: 
[ARSOF will] provide our nation the world’s premier special operations 
units, capable of prosecuting the most sensitive special warfare campaigns 
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and executing the most difficult surgical strike operations, while providing 
seamless and persistent special operations support to join-force 
commanders worldwide. (ARSOF 2022, 2013, p. 17)  
Figure 1 presents the foundational concepts for the entirety of U.S. Army Special 
Operations Forces. Of note is that the SFGs lean heavily to the left side of the chart, the 
SW side. This is where USASOC sees SF’s greatest utility to the nation as well as where 
the Regiment fits in the operationalization of USASOC’s vision; conducting UW, FID, 
and other SW, or, indirect operations.  
However, USASOC has identified some critical gaps in capabilities and areas that 
require focus for ARSOF to accomplish the “special warfare” role. Chief among those 
gaps is the ability to wage unconventional warfare, which USASOC says has been 
degraded over the last decade of war and requires new emphasis and training focus. 
ARSOF 2022 highlights this point saying, “…this will require a paradigm shift and an 
assessment of the historic role of SOF versus the more publicized role our force assumed 
over the last decade” (ARSOF 2022, 2013, pp. 13–14). Additionally, USASOC points out 
that in order to be successful, ARSOF must integrate more fully with U.S. Army 
conventional forces and interagency efforts to accomplish USASOC goals and National 
Security objectives. More than a simple re-focusing of effort, however USASOC says, 
“the soldiers in our special warfare units must recognize that their value lies not only in 
their lethality, but in the fact that they are trained, educated, led, equipped and organized 
in unique ways to meet the demands of an uncertain future” (ARSOF 2022, 2013, p. 13).  
To summarize the above strategies for change, SF will need to increase its 
capability to conduct special warfare activities and integrate more fully with interagency 
and conventional forces. Additionally, SF must be prepared to play a major role in the 
establishment of the Global SOF Network through its interaction with foreign forces. In 
order to do this, SF must refocus training efforts to prepare for FID and UW missions as 
well as build its capability for relationship building, both of US and foreign partners. This 
research is designed to identify and diagnose the condition of the organizational culture 
of SF and determine if that culture is a hindrance to achieving high degrees of 
performance in relation to these changes in mission focus.  
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Specifically, this research will focus on how SF’s organizational culture hinders 
or promotes the Regiment’s ability to play a strong role in building the Global SOF 
Network, conduct SW operations such as FID and UW as effectively as possible, and 
integrate with CF and interagency elements to improve operational success; all elements 
of higher headquarters’ vision and goals for the future. Additionally, this study will 
discover what aspects of the organizational culture prevent SF from being as effective as 
possible in their execution of SW missions such as FID and UW. Some of the non-lethal 
skills required in SW, specifically for UW and FID operations will be extracted from 
doctrine and discussed below. 
3. Requirements Outlined in Doctrine 
As stated above, indirect application of SF will be the norm in the future. This 
shift in mission focus requires a shift in the manner in which SF conduct business. In 
order to determine some of the nuances of what SF will have to do in the future, or what 
attributes it must possess to be successful, it is important to look at the doctrinal 
documents that pertain to the missions that will be the focus of the future. Much of the 
emphasis of this research will be on the effects of the current organizational culture in 
relation to SF’s ability to gain or increase the attributes and skills described below.  
FM 3-18: Special Forces Operations lists several “characteristics” of Special 
Forces that allow the SFGs to succeed in uncertain environments. Of note from those 
characteristics are the ability of SF Units to have regional orientation, have excellent 
cross cultural communication skills, be culturally astute, understand the nuances of 
foreign languages, and be skilled in operating in the Joint, Interagency, and political 
arenas (2012).  
ADP 3-05: Special Operations says, “Special Operations forces are unique in the 
execution of their operations because of their skills in the conduct of people-oriented 
operations” (2012, p. 13). This document seconds the characteristics from FM 3-18 
described above; listing attributes such as language trained, regionally aligned, culturally  
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astute, politically nuanced, trained in negotiation and mediation and proficient in inter-
organizational coordination as the qualities that allow SF soldiers to carry out special 
warfare activities. (2012) 
As FID and UW missions acquire greater attention from commanders, this 
research turns to doctrine specific to these mission which further highlight the importance 
of non-lethal skills that are requirements for successful execution of future SW 
operations. ATP 3-05.1: Unconventional Warfare says, “It is impossible to overstate the 
importance of foreign language proficiency as a key competency to conduct UW” (ATP 
3-05-1, 2013, p. B3). Furthermore, it condemns those who do not strive for language 
competency saying such a, “demonstrated lack of such motivation, self-discipline, and 
curiosity is a key indicator of unsuitability and lack of aptitude for UW” (ATP 3-05-1, 
2013, B2). 
The Foreign Internal Defense Field Manual, FM 3-05.2, states, “as a force 
multiplier, SF units maintain advanced skills and capabilities (such as language) that 
enable them to conduct advisory operations with the HN for extended periods of time” 
(2011, p. 2-18). The document further states, “a FID operation can be critically disabled 
within the first few moments of contact with [Host Nation (HN)] military, civilian 
officials, or even ordinary citizens, if vital cultural mores are violated by U.S. personnel” 
(2011, p. 4-3). Essentially, these two documents stress the importance of two skills, 
language and cultural knowledge, to the successful accomplishment of FID and UW 
missions. Though there are many other tasks associated with these operations, these two 
skills will be referred to often during the discussion of empirical findings in Chapter III. 
As these are “vital” skills, many of the survey questions revolve around determining if 
the organizational culture fosters or hinders the building of these skills on the ODAs.  
It is true that SF is second to none in conducting operations alongside foreign 
counterparts. However, through personal experience and informal discussions with 
former ODA members and fellow SF officers it has become apparent that many officers 
and soldiers within the Regiment are not motivated to acquire the non-lethal skills 
outlined above which are vital to the indirect operations most likely to be conducted. The 
reason for the lack of motivation is an informal organizational culture that has developed 
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as SF deployed to, survived, and performed successfully during multiple years of direct 
combat utilization. This organizational culture focuses more on the direct application of 
forces in combat environments and places a premium on expertise at the lethal skills.  
C. ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE APPLIED TO SPECIAL FORCES 
As discussed previously, in order to be as successful as possible, organizations—
leaders and members alike—must manage and shape effective organizational cultures 
that are the right fit for the goals the organization is trying to achieve. Without an 
understanding of SF’s organizational culture, it may prove difficult to implement new 
missions and expect the same level of motivation, training focus, dedication, and 
excellence which are ultimately what has allowed SF to successfully accomplish its 
combat missions in the past. In order to describe how the concept of organizational 
culture applies to Special Forces, the following will provide examples of SF culture in 
relation to Schein’s levels of organizational culture. Then I will provide an understanding 
of the functions that SF’s organizational culture plays in the Regiment’s performance.  
1. Levels of Special Forces’ Organizational Culture 
As stated in Chapter I, organizational culture can be witnessed in three levels: 
artifacts, espoused values, and assumptions. The following figure and discussion 
describes these levels in relation to the Special Forces Regiment. 
  23 
 
Figure 2.  Levels of Culture (after Schein, 1995) 
As shown in Figure 2, artifacts are easily identifiable aspects of SF’s 
organizational culture. The distinctive “green beret” headgear or the Special Forces 
Motto—“De Oppresso Liber”—are excellent examples of artifacts. Other examples 
include the internal processes for presenting mission briefs, concept of operations 
(CONOPs), and routing administrative paper work. While it is important to point out 
what artifacts of the SF organizational culture are, this research will focus little on them 
as they are often unchangeable in the military. For example, military uniforms and 
customs and courtesies are all aspects of the larger U.S. Army culture and cannot be 
changed by the regiment. Items such as the layout of workspaces or the computing 
infrastructure are very slow to change and are often not in the budget to do so. However, 
Chapter IV will recommend further areas of research into SF’s organizational culture and 
subsequent studies should research these artifacts for a more complete understanding of 
the SF organizational culture. 
The items identified above, both the strategies outlined by USSOCOM and 
USASOC as well as the “characteristics” of Special Forces posed by doctrine are the 
espoused values of SF. These values, in a strong organizational culture, should be widely 
held by leaders and soldiers alike. These espoused values are what SF believes sets it 
apart from other military units and what allows it to be successful in conducting missions 
to support the National Security of America. Essentially, the espoused values of SF are 
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the ways that when coupled with the means will achieve the ends for Special Forces. 
Various espoused values will be tested in this research.  
While the research will not test the validity or importance of these espoused 
values, it will test the degree to which those in the Regiment place worth in the espoused 
values and translate that worth into action by training and preparing to operate in a 
manner congruent with these values.  
The basic underlying assumptions in the Special Forces’ organizational culture 
are what really drive training, mission planning, preparation and execution. The 
assumptions are based in the deeply rooted perceptions and beliefs of the SF soldiers 
about how to behave, how to train, and how to operate on missions. This study will 
uncover what basic assumptions drive preparations for mission execution. Specifically, 
this study will focus on those assumptions that are either useful or disadvantageous in 
attaining the non-lethal skills required of ODAs for success in the future special warfare 
environments they are likely to be deployed.  
2. SF Performance 
The link between strong, positive, organizational cultures and increased 
organizational performance has been outlined in Chapter I. However, what is crucial to 
this research is an understanding of what organizational performance is in relation to SF. 
Firstly, it should be noted that the terms “performance” and “effectiveness” often have 
varying definitions in relation to the study of organizations. Both are commonly used to 
describe the effects of an organization’s culture on the organization’s ability to reach its 
goals. For this study, both terms will be used interchangeably.  
Some may argue that military performance may simply be the degree to which the 
mission is accomplished, or the measurement of organizational agility and efficiency 
(Kropp, Zolin, & Lindsay, 2007). While these measurements are indeed important, the 
performance of SF cannot be measured so easily as the ramifications of what the 
organization does, or fails to do, can be quite immense (Druckman, Singer, & Cott 1997). 
Therefore, a more in-depth definition of performance must be addressed.  
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Millet, Murray, and Watman (1986) assess military performance by four unique 
measurements of effectiveness at each of the levels at which military activity occurs: 
political, strategic, operational and tactical. Political effectiveness is the ability to gain 
political support from the national government in order to procure military resources and 
expand its opportunities to conduct its activities (Millet, Murray, & Watman, 1986). 
Examples of political effectiveness for SF might include the gaining of Congressional 
support for the acquisition of funds to support personnel health programs or SOF-specific 
equipment acquisition initiatives. It may also mean garnering political support for 
expansion of authorities.  
The strategic level of military effectiveness refers to the degree to which armed 
forces secure the strategic objectives that are linked to national security goals. (Millet et 
al., 1986) The operational effectiveness measurement refers to the development of 
institutional concepts and doctrine for employing major forces to achieve strategic 
objectives within a theater of war. Tactical effectiveness is the measurement of military 
activity that successfully conducts tactical engagements (lethal and non-lethal) in order to 
secure operational objectives. (Millet et al., 1986) This level is more easily identifiable 
for SF operations. For example, does an ODA effectively train its foreign counterparts on 
specific tasks during a FID deployment? Does an ODA destroy key nodes of an insurgent 
network during a raid in Afghanistan?  
These measures are important to understand as the outcomes of SF operations 
have an impact on SF’s ability to garner more political support, are the ways of 
accomplishing strategic and operational ends, and have direct and obvious tactical effects 
on both friendly and enemy forces. The organizational culture of SF plays a direct role in 
determining to what degree the SFGs are effective in these four respects. For example, if 
the organizational culture is one that does not emphasize high levels of foreign cultural 
knowledge, an ODA may, as quoted above from FM 3-05.2, create an incident by 
violating cultural norms of the HN. That incident has the possibility of decreasing all 
levels of effectiveness if it is serious enough to be considered an international incident. 
However, if the organizational culture is one that places a premium on cultural awareness 
and other such useful values, the chances are decreased such an incident will occur at all.  
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3. Assessing and Measuring SF’s Organizational Culture 
As discussed in Chapter I, as organizations change their strategy their 
organizational culture must change as well. For SF, this means as its change in mission 
focus goes from more direct, combat focus to more indirect, Special Warfare focus, the 
previously established culture must adapt as well to foster the accomplishment of the 
Regiment’s goals. In order to change the organizational culture, one must first know what 
the current culture is, what its strengths and weaknesses are and only then can the 
Regiment implement change initiatives to increase the strength and the fit of the 
organizational culture so that it may foster a higher level of performance in the future 
operating environment.  
Cameron and Quinn present three basic methods that can be used to measure and 
organization’s culture:  
A holistic approach in which the investigator becomes a participant in the 
organization; allowing for in-depth monitoring of the culture.  
Metaphorical or language approaches, where the researcher uses language 
in documents, correspondence, conversations and stories to uncover 
cultural patterns.  
Quantitative approaches in which the researcher uses questionnaires or 
interviews to uncover certain dimensions of culture. (2006, p. 148)  
However, Druckman et al. propose that when finding similarities amongst many 
organizational cultures (each SFG presumably has their own unique culture) a 
quantitative approach must be used (1997). One way to accurately measure 
organizational culture is to construct surveys based on a researcher’s ethnographic 
observations in order to ensure the survey items accurately reflect the aspects of the 
culture studied (Druckman et al., 1997). This method essentially blends the holistic and 
quantitative approaches to measure organizational culture. Since the purpose of this study 
is to find trends in the organizational culture of the SF Regiment as a whole (which 
includes each active duty SFG), it is essential to gather quantitative data. To account for 
the necessary ethnographic observations, I have over 4.5 years of time at an SFG and 
over seven years in Special Forces. My personal observations of the SF organizational 
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culture were used as the basis for the questions in the supplemental questionnaire that 
compliments the Denison Organizational Culture Survey (DOCS). As Figure 3 shows 
when these two survey items are coupled, the analysis of the data they provide should 
lead to an accurate depiction of the overall organizational culture of Special Forces as 
well as provide insight into the values and underlying assumptions about aspects of 
ODAs, such as training priorities, that will determine if the organizational culture is one 
that supports high performance in the future.  
 
Figure 3.  Research Method and Purpose 
To this end, this research will illuminate trends, based on the cluster sample of 
subjects, in the overall condition and strength of the Regiment’s organizational culture by 
utilizing a tested method of measuring organizational culture, the DOCS. This 
measurement tool has been developed by Denison Consulting based on decades of 
research in the field of organizational culture. Chapter III will go into more detail about 
the DOCS. Insights into whether the current organizational culture hinders the building of 
key skills required of SF soldiers during the execution of indirect operations will be 
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measured by a supplemental questionnaire. The aspects of the organizational culture 
measured in the supplemental questionnaire have been derived from what doctrine or 
senior SOF commanders have identified as important traits or skills that a critical for 
mission success. When analysis from these mutually supporting questionnaires is coupled 
together, this research will paint an overall picture that will answer the question: Is the 
current organizational culture of the Special Forces Regiment a hindrance to its ability to 
perform as optimally as possible in the future?  
Though Chapter III will provide further detail, it should be noted that this research 
is based on a convenient cluster sample that does not adequately represent the entirety of 
the Special Forces regiment. Additionally, while this research brings to light many 
possible issues regarding the ways the current SF organizational culture may hinder the 
Regiment’s ability to be as successful as possible, it is not to be considered an all-
encompassing analysis of that organizational culture. This point will be expanded upon 
later and recommendations for more in-depth research will be provided in Chapter IV. 
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III. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As Chapter II discussed, there are three main questions this research addresses:  
 What is the condition of the current SF Regiment organizational culture? 
 To what degree does the current organizational culture focus on direct 
application of SF ODAs? 
 Do certain aspects of the current organizational culture at the ODA level 
hinder or promote the building of skillsets necessary for success during 
missions in the future operating environment?  
In order to answer these questions, empirical data was gathered utilizing a survey. 
The first part of the survey, the Denison Organizational Culture Survey will answer 
Question 1 by providing a complete picture of SF’s overall current organizational culture. 
Part 2 of the survey, the supplemental questionnaire, will provide answers to Questions 2 
and 3. Both parts of the survey will offer unique insights into aspects of the 
organizational culture both at the higher, SF Group level and at the ODA level, which 
may be improved upon in order to provide a more positive organizational culture that will 
foster greater performance for SF in the future.  
Though the results will be discussed in detail below, it is important to note that 
the main results show SF has several aspects of its organizational culture that require 
improvement. Chief among those at the Regimental level of analysis is a lack of SF 
soldiers’ understanding of the SFGs’ vision, goals, and strategies of employing the forces 
to accomplish the objectives. Additionally, analysis will show a lack of understanding of 
the role SF plays in the larger DOD and Interagency approach to a whole of government 
solution to increase national security. At the ODA level, analysis will show that while a 
shift in mission focus is acknowledged, the beliefs, norms, and collective actions 
necessary to refocus training to meet the new objectives are not being conducted.  
As stated previously in this work, a simple random sample of subjects was 
impossible to obtain. Therefore, a cluster sample of subjects was used to gather the data 
analyzed below. This research is not meant to be wholly representative of the SF 
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Regiment. However since the respondents are officers or senior NCOs-the new 
generation of mid-level leadership-and the sample covers all active SFGs, their opinions 
and the trends shown should not be discounted due to the small cluster sample. This 
research should be accepted as an informative pilot study; the proverbial canary in the 
coalmine. It will act as the first illumination of issues that if not further studied and 
addressed may pose serious consequences to the readiness and effectiveness of the force, 
and serves as a call for deeper and more systematic research into these issues.  
A survey was distributed to Special Forces qualified officers and NCOs assigned 
to the Naval Postgraduate School to collect quantitative and qualitative data. The Denison 
Organizational Culture Survey (DOCS) utilized a series of closed-ended questions while 
several supplemental questions, designed by the researcher, used both open and closed-
ended questions to gather data regarding the organizational culture of Special Forces 
Groups.  
B. DATA COLLECTION PROCESS 
1. Respondents 
The U.S. Army Special Forces qualified personnel assigned to the Naval 
Postgraduate School made up the sample population for this research. Giving the survey 
to students at the Naval Postgraduate School reduced the risk of biased answers due to 
any undue command influences that gathering the same data from soldiers currently a 
part of the Special Forces Groups may have produced.  
 
Figure 4.  Distribution of Ranks Surveyed 
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As shown in Figure 4, the majority of subjects held the rank of major. The 
subjects averaged 34 years old and had 12.5 years of active service in the Army. Of those 
active duty years, a mean average of six were spent in Special Forces with an average 
four and a half years at their SF Groups with an average of three of those years on the SF 
ODA. Each SF Group was represented in the sample with the lowest number of subjects 
being formerly of 3
rd
 SF Group (seven subjects) and the highest formerly of 10
th
 SF 
Group (16 subjects). On average, the subjects had conducted over three combat 
deployments and two non-combat deployments (JCETs, JCS, CNT, etc.). As stated 
previously, a majority of respondents have had additional duty positions following ODA 
time as well as many with additional duty stations following their time at a SF Group. 
The average amount of time that passed since the subjects left their SF Group and took 
the survey was 17.8 months with an average time away from their ODAs of 32.3 months. 
These time spans are significant for the purposes of this research because it may be 
argued that this research, due to the fact the subjects have not been in their SF Group for 
over a year, may not accurately represent the current organizational culture of the SF 
Groups.  
Regardless, this approach still has merit in that it shows a snapshot of the 
Regiment’s organizational culture during the time period these subjects served in their SF 
Groups and presents significant issues that SF’s leadership must be aware of in order to 
prevent back-sliding and reversal of the progress to the organizational culture that may 
have been made in the interim period.  
A total of 55 of the available 58 officers and NCOs participated in the research by 
taking the DOCS survey, however only 54 participated in the supplemental questions. 
This is a 93 percent participation rate amongst the cluster sample of the qualified 
population at NPS. However, as stated previously, the subjects make up only a cluster 
sample of the total population of the Special Forces active duty SFGs. This presents an 
issue with the generalizability of the results. However, the results are not meant to make 
firm inferences to the underlying population, but rather serve as an illumination of 
possible issues. As stated above, while the sample may not provide adequate data 
regarding the whole of the Regiment, conclusions will be based on the assumption that it 
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provides valuable insight. Chapter IV will propose further research suggestions that will 
help the Regiment confirm or deny the findings of this pilot study. 
2. Survey Instrument 
a. Denison Organizational Culture Survey 
The Denison Organizational Culture Survey is based on the Denison Model that 
explores four traits of organizational culture that, according to Denison, directly link to 
high organizational performance (Denison, Hooijberg, Lane, Lief, 2012). As discussed in 
Chapter II, the DOCS utilizes 60, Likert scale questions to determine the strength and 
weaknesses of on organization’s culture. Subjects respond from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree) on the survey questions which measure four basic traits of organizational 
culture, broken down into three indices per trait. Denison consulting has gathered and 
analyzed over a decade’s worth of empirical data that directly links higher scores in these 
four traits to overall high degrees of organizational performance. Those four traits and 
their associated indices follow and are represented in Figure 5:  
 
Figure 5.  Traits and Indices Based on the Denison Model of High Performance 
Circumplex (from Denison et al., 2012)  
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Mission: a clear sense of purpose and direction that allows organizations to define 
their goals and strategies and to create a vision for the organization’s future.  
Indices:  
 Strategic direction and intent: Do employees understand the organization’s 
key strategies?  
 Goals and objectives: Do short term goals exist that link the day to day 
activities of employees to the vision, mission, and strategy of the 
organization? Are those goals ambitious yet realistic? 
 Vision: Do employees understand the vision, its implications on their 
work and does that vision excite and motivate employees? 
Adaptability: a high degree of flexibility and responsiveness to the operational 
environment.  
Indices:  
 Creating change: Does the organization look for new ways to improve the 
way it does business? Do the employees identify changes to the work 
environment and react accordingly? 
 Customer focus: Does the organization understand the needs of the 
customers it serves and is customer focus a primary concern throughout 
the organization? Are employees committed to responding to the 
customers changing requirements? 
 Organizational learning: Does the organization create an environment 
where calculated risk taking and innovation can occur and does the 
organization place importance on learning? Does the organization share 
the learned information from successful and failed experiences across the 
entire organization?  
Involvement: The extent to which the organization empowers and engages their 
workforce, build their organization around teams, and develop human capability at all 
levels.  
Indices:  
 Empowerment: Do employees feel informed and involved in their work 
and do they feel they can positively impact the organization?  
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 Team orientation: Do employees collaborate and feel mutually responsible 
for achieving objectives? Does the organization encourage and practice 
teamwork?  
 Capability development: Does the organization invest in the skills of the 
employees and are those skills improving? Does the organization have the 
skills necessary to perform at a high success rate currently and in the 
future?  
Consistency: An integrated consistent set of behaviors, rooted in core values and 
the degree to which the organization puts these values into action. 
Indices:  
 Core values: Do organizational leaders model and reinforce a set of values 
that create a strong sense of identity and a clear set of behavioral norms? 
Do employees share the same set of values? 
 Agreement: Can employees compromise and work through challenges in a 
constructive manner? Is the organization capable of reaching agreement 
on key issues? 
 Integration: Do employees from different parts of the organization share a 
common perspective which allows them to cross organizational 
boundaries to work with one another for the betterment of the organization 
as a whole? (Denison Consulting, 2012) 
b. Supplemental Questions 
Supplemental questions were designed to identify trends in aspects of the 
organizational cultures of the SF Groups. Specifically, the supplemental questions gather 
data concerning the deeply rooted assumptions, norms, and beliefs of ODAs in relation to 
the shift in mission focus of Special Operations/Special Forces discussed in Chapter I. 
These questions illuminate the degree to which the changes to the strategies, goals, 
visions, and foreseeable missions of USASOC and USSOCOM are or are not 
transforming the assumptions, norms, beliefs, and values at the ODA level. It is important 
to restate two points from Chapter I. First, when organizations change their strategy and 
goals, the organizational culture must adapt to support the new strategy or achieve the 
new goals. Second, for the organization to be as effective as possible at achieving its 
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goals and gaining or maintaining a high level of performance, the organizational culture 
must be strong and foster such results.  
The supplemental questions are presented in three categories, Future Mission and 
Direction, Training, and Rewards and Desires. Each category is further divided into 
various subsections. The supplemental questionnaire poses a mix of 55 multiple choice, 
fill in the blank, and scaled questions.    
C. SURVEY IMPLEMENTATION AND DATA COLLECTION 
Paper-pencil-surveys, along with a consent form, were issued face-to-face from 
the researcher to subjects. A brief was given to subjects regarding the instructions for 
taking the survey and the research objectives. Subjects were told to recall only their 
experiences in their former SF Group for purposes of answering the survey and the 
supplemental questions. This point was significant to make to subjects because many of 
the subjects had postings outside the SF Group after their initial SF Group tour but before 
attending the Naval Postgraduate School. It was critical that all subjects only answer 
questions from the survey in relation to their experiences at their Special Forces Group as 
any follow-on learning could not be accurately accounted for and was not necessary to 
this research. Last, subjects were instructed to take the surveys individually.  
Data for the DOCS was collected by the researcher and packaged in Excel. This 
data was then sent to Denison Consulting for analysis and production of only the 
circumplex report. All further evaluation of the results was conducted by the researcher.  
The following section will describe the trends that emerged from both the DOCS 
and the supplemental questionnaire in relation to the entire SF Regiment.  
D. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
1. Denison Organizational Culture Survey 
The Circumplex report in Figure 6 displays the sample’s results in each of the 
twelve indices of the Denison Organizational Culture Survey. The scores represent SF’s 
performance compared to the other organizations in Denison’s Global Database and the  
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results are shown as a percentile. For example in the Vision index, depicted in Figure 6, 
SF scored in the 10
th
 percentile. This means they scored higher than ten percent of the 
organizations in the Denison Global Database.  
 
Figure 6.  Denison Organizational Culture Survey (DOCS) Results Special 
Forces Regiment (from Denison Consulting, 2014) 
In the Denison model, highly successful performing organizations have high 
percentile scores in each of the four dimensions and 12 indices. In essence, higher 
percentile scores in each index are better, and more balance throughout the entire graph is 
better.  
Though Special Forces scored high in two traits (5/6 indices) it scored relatively 
low on the overall DOCS. Generally, the analysis shows SF’s organizational culture is 
likely hindering its ability to operate as effectively as possible to achieve its highest level 
of performance. Overall, respondents scored very low on both Adaptability and Mission 
traits, however scored at least higher than 50 percent of organizations in the Denison 
Global Database in all three indices that make up the Involvement trait and two of the 
three indices that make up the Consistency trait.  
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a. Analysis by Trait and Index 
(1) Adaptability: Figure 7 displays the DOCS results in the Adaptability trait. 
 
Figure 7.  DOCS Results of Adaptability Trait 
(from Denison Consulting, 2014) 
Special Forces scored the lowest on the Adaptability trait of the DOCS. In fact, 
the lowest overall percentile score of the entire DOCS was in the Customer Service index 
of this trait. The low score in this index reveal that the respondents do not have a clear 
understanding of U.S. Army and Interagency (the specified “customers”) requirements 
and are not fully comfortable with the current level of interaction those customers have 
with SF. Only five percent of respondents gave a “strongly agree” or “agree” response to 
the question, “All members have a deep understanding of U.S. Army and Interagency 
wants and needs.” This is significant in that it shows SF soldiers do not understand where 
they, and their unique skills, fit into the larger Army, DOD, and Interagency missions to 
secure the nation. As Special Forces will undoubtedly work more closely with 
Interagency partners and as SF and conventional force integration becomes the norm, this 
aspect of SF’s organizational culture will likely hinder its ability to effectively operate 
with these entities unless changed.  
The Organizational Learning index received a 12 percentile score which shows 
that respondents believe that the process of learning through innovation and risk taking is 
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lacking within the Regiment. Additionally, this low score implies that what learning does 
take place is not being communicated to other parts of the Regiment or SF Group  
The highest percentile score for this trait was in the Creating Change index, with 
21 percentile. Though 21 is not a high percentile score, it does show that more emphasis 
at the SF Groups is placed on flexibility and responsiveness to changes in the operating 
environment. The lowest level of agreement was given to the question, “The way things 
are done is very flexible and easy to change.” The strongest level of agreement was given 
to the question, “New and improved ways to do work are continually adopted.” Though 
the scores to these questions seem at odds with each other, the data may suggest that 
while SF Groups constantly seek and implement new ways of conducting training and 
operations, once accepted as the norm, there seems little room for change. The positive 
side of this analysis is that if the appropriate standard operating procedures, ones that 
foster the attainment of goals and objectives for the organization, are instituted they will 
easily become the norm and will ultimately become part of the organization’s culture.  
(2) Mission: Figure 8 displays the DOCS results in the Mission trait. 
 
Figure 8.  DOCS Results of Mission Trait (from Denison Consulting, 2014) 
Responses in the Mission trait were low for all three indices. Overall this presents 
a challenge for SF as it shows that the majority of respondents do not have a clear 
understanding of SF’s vision and its strategies to reach its objectives in the future. The 
data also suggests that the respondents do not perceive a clear link in how their day to 
day activities play a coordinated role in the achievement of their SF Group’s goals.  
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The lowest score was in the Vision index with ten percentile. This low score 
signifies that the Regiment’s vision for the future is not fully understood. Additionally, it 
shows that long-term goals of the SF Groups are often pushed aside for the betterment of 
short term goals. This data may be based in part on the fact that the indirect operations 
many of the respondents believe SF should be conducting (see Supplemental Questions) 
have been compromised by a more direct operational usage during the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. Empirical evidence of this assumption was not tested in this 
research, however.  
The data shows that SF soldiers know their commanders have a long-term vision, 
however this vision does not excite the soldiers. This may simply be a misunderstanding 
of the commander’s vision, or it may be that the soldiers do not believe the future 
operations they will undertake will be intrinsically rewarding. If the latter is the case then 
obviously this aspect of SF’s organizational culture will hinder its future ability to 
perform at the highest degree.  
The Strategic Direction and Intent index received a percentile score of 16. This 
low score reinforces the notion that the strategic direction of SF is not fully understood 
by the respondents. The respondents are not able to clearly identify the long term purpose 
of their SF Groups.  
The Goals and Objectives index also received a score of 16 percentile. 
Respondents do not perceive clear links between the vision, strategy, long-term and 
short-term goals and the missions and training their ODAs conduct. Since the question, 
“The leadership has ‘gone on record’ about the objectives we are trying to meet” received 
the highest level of agreement, but the question, “There is widespread agreement about 
the SF Group's goals” received the lowest, there seems to be disparity between what the 
leadership believes the goals of the organization are, or should be, compared to the 
widespread beliefs of those under their command. A reason for this disparity is 
discovered and discussed in the supplemental questions below.  
The reason for the low scores in these two indices may be in part due to the 
changing nature of the mission focus that currently is transforming the way SF operates. 
While many of the operations in the last decade were direct, combat operations, and very 
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easily linked to higher headquarters’ objectives, many others (JCETs, JCS, CNTs, etc.) 
were may not have been so clearly or directly linked to a higher headquarters objectives 
or initiatives. Higher headquarters in the Regiment understands that SF cannot be 
everywhere, at all times. Those commanders understand that using their precious few 
resources need to result in achieving the most effective outcomes. However, as SF 
changes the mission focus to a more indirect role, and as it is more selective in where its 
forces are allocated, it is imperative to ensure the linkage between the mission and the 
intermediate and long term goals are effectively communicated and understood by the 
ODAs who will undertake the missions.  
(3) Consistency: Figure 9 displays the DOCS results in the Consistency trait. 
 
Figure 9.  DOCS Results of Consistency Trait 
(from Denison Consulting, 2014) 
Respondents scored the overall Consistency trait relatively highly, with two of the 
three indices receiving scores above the 50 percentile. Overall, therefore, the respondents 
feel that strong values are in place. Also there is an overall feeling of agreement on key 
issues and about the right way to do business that allows the SF Groups to achieve their 
missions and goals.  
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The Core Values index received a 51 percentile score and shows that not only are 
a strong set of core values in place and adhered to amongst the SF Group but also that 
leaders practice what they preach and that everyone follows an ethical code that prevents 
the unit from bringing trouble upon itself.  
The highest percentile score, 74, was in the Agreement index. This shows a strong 
aspect of the organization’s culture which is the ability to solve problems. When issues 
arise, the respondents believe consensus is easy to achieve because members of the SF 
Group know what the right thing to do is. When the proper action to be taken is unclear, 
the respondents believe members of their SF Group work hard to compromise and 
achieve win-win solutions. Additionally, over 80 percent of respondents said they 
“agree” or “strongly agree” to the following statement, “There is a ‘strong’ culture of 
your SF Group.” While this, in itself, is a positive, if that culture is not helping the 
organization move in the right direction, such a strong culture can be a hindrance to the 
overall effectiveness of the organization.  
The low score in the Coordination and Integration index (23 percentile) shows the 
issues many of the respondents have working across other parts of their SF Groups. Over 
50 percent of respondents said it was hard to coordinate projects across different parts of 
the SF Group. The data suggests roadblocks, either formal or informal, are in place and 
prevent smooth synchronization and integration throughout the SF Group.  
(4) Involvement: Figure 10 displays the DOCS results in the Involvement trait. 
 
Figure 10.  DOCS Results of Involvement Trait 
(from Denison Consulting, 2014) 
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Special Forces scored very well on the three indices that make up the Involvement 
index. The respondents overwhelmingly believe the Regiment has provided and 
developed the necessary tools and skills and given them the power and autonomy to get 
the job done. These positive aspects of SF’s organizational culture seem to be the 
bedrock of SF’s current ability to effectively accomplish the missions it is assigned. This 
is no surprise as SF was established to and currently does recruit highly skilled operators 
who conduct missions with small teams of highly trained, empowered soldiers and 
succeed in extreme operational environments.  
The high score in the Capability Development index (62 percent) signifies the 
continued emphasis that the Regiment places on selecting, training, developing and 
mentoring highly capable soldiers. Additionally, it shows the widely held belief that the 
organization has the ability to improve its capabilities and strives to do so.  
The Team Orientation index scored highly as well (71 percent) and signifies, as 
mentioned above, the strong reliance on small teams to achieve results. This, again, is an 
excellent quality the Regiment possess and is the primary building block on which a track 
record of success has been developed.  
Lastly, the Empowerment index scored 78 percent, the highest score on the 
DOCS. This index shows the degree to which respondents believe that not only are most 
SF soldiers involved in their own jobs, but that those soldiers are involved in the planning 
processes as well. This fact corresponds to the empowerment SF has given to their ODAs 
as tactical training, planning, and mission execution tend to be conducted at the lower 
levels. Additionally, and most importantly, the respondents expressed that they can have 
a positive impact on the mission. Again, this aspect of the organization’s culture is deeply 
rooted and derives from the long tradition that humans are more important than hardware 
in SOF operations.  
The Involvement trait seems to be the bedrock on which SF currently succeeds 
and will continue to succeed regardless of the outcome and analysis of the other traits 
measured on the DOCS. However, what the aggregate data from each trait shows is that 
while SF Groups have been succeeding by relying on the strength of the ODAs (and other 
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small elements) there is room for improvement in other areas that could increase the 
degree to which the overall organizational culture could facilitate mission success in the 
future. Though SF has made great achievements over the last decade and contributed 
immeasurably to the security of the United States, if the organizational culture fostered 
greater effectiveness and higher performance the Regiment could possibly support 
National Security to an even greater degree.  
2. Supplemental Questions 
The supplemental questions measure various norms, values, assumptions, and 
beliefs of the subjects in relation to three categories; Future Mission and Direction, 
Training, and Rewards and Desires. The analysis of the results is broken down into these 
categories though many questions will show trends that span the categories. The results 
will be discussed as they relate to the Special Forces Regiment as a whole. Additionally, 
the analysis of the trends from the supplemental questions will be matched, where 
applicable, to the outcome of the DOCS.  
a. Future Mission and Direction 
This section, containing 15 questions, measures perceptions concerning the 
presence of the shift in mission focus, as discussed in Chapter I, from a more direct 
combat role to a more indirect role that Special Forces will play in conducting future 
operations.  
(1) Perceptions of Mission Focus Shift 
Six questions in this subsection pertain to perceptions on the shift in mission 
focus from direct to indirect utilization of SF.  
When asked if subjects perceive a change in mission focus, and to which area, 59 
percent replied they indeed saw a change in mission focus and believed UW to have more 
emphasis within their SF BN or SFG (See Figure 11). Nearly a quarter (24 percent) 
believed FID to be the new mission focus. Only seven percent believed Direct Action 
was the new mission focus, with seven percent believing there was no change at all.  
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Figure 11.  Perception of BN or SFG Change in Mission Focus 
To support the above perceptions, subjects were asked which SF mission soldiers 
under their command are most likely to conduct in the next decade. 89 percent responded 
that FID would be most likely undertaken the most over the coming decade while COIN 
and UW scored the other 11 percent together. It is important to note that not a single 
subject believed the more direct action mission, SR, HR, DA, CT would be undertaken 
the most.  
When asked if a shift in mission focus was required, 69 percent agreed to a higher 
level. When this is coupled with the data above, it shows the majority of those surveyed 
believe SF’s strategic utility is better served by the current change in mission focus to 
indirect operations other than direct combat.  
When asked if the subjects believed that a majority of the members of their ODB 
identified the shift in mission focus from direct to indirect operations, 52 percent said 
either yes, everyone, or the majority of everyone, in their OBD believed there was a 
change in mission focus. 32 percent said some members of their ODB perceived a 
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in mission focus. These numbers are excellent in that they portray, at least initially, that 
ODBs understand changes are being made to the manner in which SF is utilized to gain 
more strategic utility.  
However, when asked if the knowledge of the change in focus, stated above, was 
turned into action, meaning a change in attitude or the manner in which the ODB 
conducted business, only 39 percent said a majority or the entirety of their ODBs 
changed their way of doing business to adapt to the new mission focus. 50 percent stated 
there was no, or minimal change in attitudes or the way the ODBs conducted business. 
This data may show that while ODBs understand that higher levels dictate a change in 
mission focus, they believe that they do not actually need to adapt their manner of 
conducting training in order to be successful at more indirect utilization. However, one 
may argue that the above data does not support my finding if ODBs were already 
conducting business in a manner that didn’t require a change in attitude or procedures but 
still were efficient at preparing for indirect operations. However, the remainder of the 
analysis of supplemental questions suggests this is not the case.  
Subjects were next asked what would be a primary motivator for them to fully 
support a change in mission focus within the subjects’ respective SF Groups. 59 percent 
said that in depth discussions with command elements on the reasons for the shift in 
focus would sufficiently motivate them to provide their full support. Additionally, 20 
percent stated that exciting opportunities for duty positions based on the change of 
mission focus would drive them to fully support and shift their mindsets. These 
motivational factors are key when commanders look for ways to create solidarity within 
the lower levels of their units.  
The information from the above data analysis is crucial as the perceptions and 
trends should account for trends in the training section, however they do not. 
Discrepancies between what the respondents’ perceptions of the future are and how their 
organizations actually act and feel toward the change in mission focus will be the subject 
of the following section.  
 
  46 
(2) ODA Leadership Perceptions Vs ODA Member Perceptions 
In this subsection, subjects were asked a series of questions about their 
perceptions on certain topics and the perception of their ODAs. This subsection will show 
that disparity exists between senior and junior members of the ODAs and will describe 
what may be the reason for the disparity. 
Subjects were asked if they believed, in their professional opinion, whether SF 
should conduct more direct or more indirect operations (See Figure 12). An 
Overwhelming 96 percent responded saying SF should conduct more indirect operations. 
However, when asked if the majority of the members of respondents’ ODAs were given 
the same question, what would be the response? In that case, 61 percent of subjects said 
they believed the majority of their ODAs would say SF should conduct more direct 
operations. This disparity shows a disagreement or lack of common understanding 
amongst officers, NCOs, and junior enlisted members of the ODA on how SF should be 
best used to achieve strategic utility for the nation. If nothing else, it shows that senior 
ODA members and junior ODA members are not in agreement on this point, which 
should be a widely and strongly held assumption in a strong organizational culture. 
 
Figure 12.  Future Mission and Direction: Should SF Conduct More Direct or 
Indirect Operations? 
The next two questions were designed to discover any difference in perception 
about which SF missions would provide the most personal fulfillment for SF soldiers. 
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the most fulfillment. The highest response was 46 percent saying a FID mission with 
actual combat advisory roles would give them the most personal fulfillment. 20 percent 
said Advanced Special Operations would be most fulfilling. Only 28 percent total said 
either SF leading a partner force in Direct Action operations (15 percent) or conducting 
unilateral DA operations (13 percent) would be most personally fulfilling.  
These data are significant when compared to the subjects’ beliefs about what the 
other members of their former ODAs would say to the same question. Direct Action 
operations in total received an 85 percent response; 59 percent for unilateral and 26 
percent for leading a partner force. Only 15 percent of those surveyed believed their 
ODA members would chose a FID mission as the most fulfilling. This disparity among 
what would be considered satisfying by the senior and junior ODA members shows many 
within the Regiment are motivated by highly different things. This analysis highlights the 
findings from the Goals and Objectives index of the Mission trait in the DOCS analysis.  
As mentioned to above, SF Group leadership has publicly stated the goals of the 
organization however there is not widespread agreement on those goals amongst the rank 
and file. The reason for that disparity is shown in the above subsection. SF soldiers are 
motivated to conduct more direct operations and SF Groups are preparing for more 
indirect operations. When motivation is high to do something that does not achieve the 
stated goals of the organization the organizational culture likely hinders the unit’s 
performance.  
(3) Motivations and De Oppresso Liber 
The data from the next set of questions may lead to an understanding of why this 
disparity exists (See Figure 13). Subjects were asked to choose an approximate 
percentage of their former ODA teammates who joined SF because those new recruits 
primarily wanted to conduct Direct Action operations. As shown in Figure 13, 87 percent 
said half or more of their ODAs joined SF because they believed SF would conduct 
primarily Direct Action operations.  
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Figure 13.  Future Mission and Direction: Percentage of ODA Motivated to Join 
SF to Conduct DA Operations? 
To determine how strong the belief and motivation to conduct DA operations was 
to those on the ODAs, the survey next asked what percentage of the subjects’ ODAs left 
the Regiment/Army because they were not conducting enough DA operations to suit their 
desires. The majority, 46 percent said not a single member of their ODA left the 
Regiment/Army because they were not conducting enough DA to suit their desires. 
Thirty-three percent said only a quarter of their ODA left for this reason, however.  
One conclusion that may be drawn from these responses is that SF soldiers are 
adaptable and can change their opinions and primary motivations. This is excellent news 
regarding the ability of the Regiment to change its organizational culture. Those that 
wanted to join SF primarily to conduct DA have not gotten out but have stayed in even 
though their primary motivation was not intrinsically rewarded. This means those soldiers 
are willing to change their opinions, assumptions, and motivations.  
While the above data is simply respondents’ opinions of other SF soldiers’ beliefs 
and it may be argued that the data might be biased. However, the nature of interpersonal 
relationships amongst members of the ODAs is such that strong bonds of friendship are 
formed along with a daily closeness that allows ODA members to have intimate 






What percentage of your former ODA teammates were motivated to join SF 
because they primarily wanted to conduct DA operations and they believed SF 
would conduct DA a majority of the time? 
0% of ODA: 0 Respondents
25% of ODA: 7 Respondents
50% of ODA: 14 Respondents
75% of ODA: 28 Respondents
100% of ODA: 5 Respondents
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research, data collected on subjects’ perceptions of their former teammates’ beliefs are 
crucial to understanding the organizational culture, albeit the data may not be 100 percent 
accurate.  
The last two questions of this subsection measure the degree to which subjects 
believed their past and future operations lived up the values suggested in the Special 
Forces Motto: “De Oppresso Liber.” When asked if the operations they have conducted 
while in SF were typified by the motto, 67 percent said either “no, not really though 
sometimes” or “never.” Only 33 percent said “mostly” or “always.” These percentages 
show that whatever SF has done operationally over the previous few years is not being 
perceived by its soldiers as adhering to the higher calling SF was designed to conduct. 
Though the truth of the matter is much more likely to be the opposite, the perception still 
exists amongst the ranks; SF is not living up to its motto.  
The perception of the future does not look any different. When asked if they 
believed their future operations over the next decade would typify the motto, the 
majority, 72 percent said “no, not really, though sometimes” with only 35 percent saying, 
“mostly.”  
The espoused value that SF exists to liberate those that are oppressed is an 
important one. It was the very nature of the Regiment’s founding. Though the SF 
Regiment does not choose which missions it conducts, it does chose how it relates to 
subordinates why the mission is being conducted and how subordinate units’ roles play a 
significant part. The data from the above two questions clearly shows that a negative 
perception exists. This fact may relate strongly to the Mission trait of the DOCS. The 
trends show that ODAs do not understand clearly the strategy of their higher headquarters 
and do not understand how their ODAs play a significant role in achieving their SF 
Groups’ goals and objectives. The SF Regiment can indeed change this perception and 
must do so if it is to build a healthy organizational culture founded on values.  
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b. Training 
This section considers the norms and beliefs of how training time is utilized. It 
tests the level of agreement on the emphasis that is given to training on various tasks that 
may be build necessary skills which will be crucial for future mission success during 
indirect operations.  
(1) Use of Training Time. This subsection contains questions that gather data 
on the amount of time spent conducting various training tasks, subjects’ level of 
satisfaction with the time spent, and reasons more time is not placed on the various tasks. 
The goal of this subsection is to determine the emphasis placed on various training tasks 
in order to understand where the training focus lies; in relation to the skills most useful in 
indirect operations and those more applicable to direct action operations.  
As Figure 14 shows, in general, weapons proficiency, small unit tactics and close 
quarters battle (CQB) were each trained for greater lengths of time (measured in weeks 
per quarter) than language training. Additionally, cultural awareness training was 
conducted less than two hours a week. The discussion below provides interesting insight 
into the priorities of training tasks and reasons why language proficiency and cultural 
awareness training were given the least emphasis.  
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Figure 14.  Time Devoted to Training Tasks 
The slight majority of respondents, 44 percent, stated they spent between 4 to 8 
weeks per quarter conducting weapons training. A strong minority of 43 percent said they 
conducted this training from one to three weeks per quarter. The majority, 70 percent, 
believed the above training time was adequate. However, 22 percent believed more time 
must be spent on weapons training. The reasons why more time was not spent conducting 
weapons training were mixed. The majority, only 26 percent, said they believed they 
were at an acceptable level of proficiency on this skill, while 24 percent believed admin 
duties stood in the way of further weapons training. However, 24 percent chose to write 
in responses. Of note from the write in responses was the majority said other required 
training took priority and prevented them from doing more weapons training.  
When asked the amount of time devoted to CQB, 59 percent of respondents said 
their ODAs spent one to three weeks per quarter on this skill. However, 24 percent said 
they spent either four to eight weeks or over eight weeks per quarter on CQB. The 
majority, 80 percent believed the time they spent on training CQB was adequate and 48 
percent believed they were at an acceptable level of proficiency in this skill. This data 
shows the high amount of time devoted to training CQB as well as the fact that many 
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respondents said the amount of time was adequate to produce the desired level of 
proficiency. This widely shared belief shows that in SF’s organizational culture CQB is 
believed to be of high importance to which long periods of training time must be devoted.  
Small unit tactics (SUT) were trained by the majority (56 percent) of respondents 
for one to three weeks per quarter with nearly a quarter (24 percent) of respondents 
saying they spent less than one week on the task. A very small minority (13 percent), 
however, said their ODAs spent between four to eight weeks on SUT. The slight majority 
of respondents (56 percent) believed they did not spend enough time training SUT, 
however a strong minority, 44 percent, believed the amount of time spent on this task was 
sufficient. Only 26 percent of those surveyed believed they were proficient in this task 
and required no more time increasing their level of proficiency. While 24 percent said 
administrative duties prevented them from training more on SUT, 37 percent said other 
training tasks took priority.  
In stark contrast to the above three training tasks, language proficiency training, 
received much less attention. According to a total of 67 percent of respondents less than 
one week per quarter (48 percent) or no weeks per quarter (19 percent) were spent 
increasing language capability. Only 31 percent said their ODAs spent from one to three 
weeks increasing their language proficiency per quarter. The vast majority of those 
surveyed (81 percent), however, were not satisfied with the minimal amount of time 
devoted to this skill. While 66 percent said other training or administrative requirements 
prevented them from spending more time on language proficiency, several respondents 
chose to write in reasons they were unable to spend more time reaching fluency in their 
assigned languages. Of note from the written responses were multiple references to a lack 
of command or ODA emphasis for this training, a lack of training resources, or the fact 
that their assigned language was not spoken in the country to which they were primarily 
deployed to. An example of this was Spanish speaking, 7
th
 SF Group officers and French 
speaking 3
rd
 SF Group officers who were constantly deployed to Afghanistan where 
Spanish and French were not spoken.  
The last set of questions in this subsection concern the amount of emphasis placed 
on enhancing cultural awareness at the ODA level. Respondents overwhelming showed 
  53 
little attention was paid to this skill with 78 percent saying their ODAs spent less than 
two hours per week to increase their cultural knowledge. Though 63 percent admitted 
they needed to spend more time on this training task, the remainder believed they were 
satisfied with the minor amount of time spent. As above, priority given to other training 
or administrative tasks were the most highly chosen reason more time was not devoted to 
increasing the level of cultural awareness.  
(2) Motivation and “Soft” Skills. The above data shows that of the available 
training time in a quarter, increasing the non-lethal skills such as cultural awareness and 
language proficiency of ODAs was not given priority. Though most respondents said 
they believed their ODAs needed more training on language proficiency, the following 
set of data suggests motivation to increase language capability is, however, very low.  
Subjects were asked how much personal time they devoted to increasing their 
language capability. Since team training time was limited, it can be concluded that if 
language capability was truly important to the subjects they may have used their personal 
time to increase their capability. However, 63 percent of respondents said they spent less 
than two hours per week studying language on their own. Only 28 percent said they spent 
between two and four hours per week and nine percent said they spent over four hours 
per week. Overwhelmingly the reason given for not spending personal time to enhance 
their language capability was that the respondents felt personal time was to be spent with 
their families or other “off-time” activities. While this is absolutely understandable given 
the high OPTEMPO that SF soldiers live daily, this data says something about the 
organizational culture of SF that needs to change. Simply, language is important, but not 
important enough to divert personal time. Therefore, dedicated training time needs to be 
devoted to this skill.    
The belief is widely held that language is, indeed, important and requires more 
training time, however ODAs are either unwilling or unable to spend less time on the 
more lethal skills (weapons proficiency, CQB or SUT) to devote more time to language 
proficiency. The disparity between the importance of language proficiency, as evidenced 
by those that feel they need to train more time on it, and the amount of training time 
devoted to language capability enhancement shows that the espoused value SF has of 
having excellent language capability may not be widely shared amongst its soldiers. If it 
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were, the data would suggest that the time spent on increasing language capability would 
be satisfactory to the respondents, the majority would believe they were at an acceptable 
level of language proficiency and the personal time devoted to language training would 
remain low because the respondents would have conducted this training to a high degree 
during the workweek.  
The overall data analyzed in this subsection show that weapons training, followed 
by CQB received the greatest amount of emphasis and attention. While undoubtedly given 
any environment and any mission, the ability to shoot, move and communicate are vital to 
survival and therefore must be trained to a high degree of proficiency. However, as data 
shows, other tasks, both training and administrative take up precious time. When time is 
short, the organizational culture of SF has promoted the priority of training time should be 
spent on the “lethal” skills over the “soft” skills. However, it may be argued that these skills, 
though important in which to be proficient, are less necessary than small unit tactics, 
language proficiency and cultural understanding if indeed more indirect operations such as 
FID and UW are to be the focus of SF for the future.  
(3) What’s Important to Whom. The next subsection asks subjects what 
training tasks were most important, why they were important, and tests the level that 
senior commanders perceive the same importance for the given training tasks.  
When given nine training tasks and asked which one the respondents’ ODA 
needed to focus on the most, the response was quite varied (see Figure 15). While 
language proficiency did receive the majority of direct response, it was only 17 percent. 
The “Other” responses varied, however the majority said a combination of the listed tasks 
were necessary. The following figure depicts the rates of responses:  
  55 
 
Figure 15.  Training: The Training Area Respondents Believed Needed the Most 
Emphasis for Success in Future Missions 
When asked why they selected the particular task, only four percent believed it 
was because their ODAs were deficient in that task compared to the others. The majority 
of respondents (46 percent) chose the task they did because they believed it would be 
used most in the upcoming decade of SF utilization. The second most prevalent reason 
chosen (24 percent) was because they believed the task would be most useful in an 
upcoming deployment.  
To understand the relationship between what ODAs perceive as the most 
important task required to be successful in the future and what the perception of 
BN/Group commanders, subjects were asked to select, from the same set of tasks, which 
one carried the most weight with their commanders. Again, the results vary, however 
CQB received 26 percent and language proficiency received 24 percent. Of the 33 
percent who chose write in answers, there a high amount of variance but some said there  
 
  56 
was no discernable focus, many others suggested their commanders were focused on Pre-
Mission Training events or other events that emphasized multi-task training such as UW 
culmination exercises.  
While the responses given by those surveyed showed variance in the tasks they 
thought were most necessary for success and what they believed to be important to their 
commander there is a more important point from this subsection to be highlighted. Since 
the most important task for the respondents’ ODAs varied, but the reason most of them 
chose the certain task was because they thought it would be used most in the coming 
decade, this shows a possible lack of common understanding about what how SF will 
operate in the future and what tasks will be of primary importance in order to be 
successful. This suggests that the organization has not built a common culture that 
perceives the same future for the Regiment. This point supports the findings of the DOCS 
analysis in the Mission trait.  
(4) Training Guidance. One may hypothesize that the discrepancy pointed out 
in the previous sub-section between what the respondents believed to be most important 
for their ODA and what they believed was most emphasized from their higher 
headquarters might be an issue with leadership or training guidance. However this 
subsection reveals that is not the case. Subjects were asked how often they followed their 
commanders’ training guidance and how often that guidance was enforced. The results 
show that 87 percent said they followed their commander’s guidance over 50 percent of 
the time. What’s more, 65 percent responded that their commanders’ guidance was 
enforced most of the time or always.  
Since commanders’ guidance was followed and enforced, yet the previous 
subsection was unclear on exactly what was most important to train on for future success, 
it may be concluded that there is great discrepancy among the SF ranks as to exactly what 
the future holds. This confusion proves again the findings of the DOCS in the Mission 
trait.  
(5) Training Tasks and Deployment Scenarios. The following subsection 
provides subjects with a series of scenarios about deployments they may undergo and 
asks them, given one week of training prior to the various types of deployments, what 
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one training task would a majority of their ODAs liked to have seen conducted? These 
questions were asked to determine the respondents’ perceptions about whether the 
majority of their teammates would choose to do the same type of training regardless of 
whether the mission would call for it. The results are depicted in Figure 16.  
The scenarios given were a FID deployment, a combat deployment to 
Afghanistan, a UW mission, and a CNT mission. In all cases minus the UW mission, the 
highest number of respondents said the majority of their ODAs would want to train on 
CQB and SUT the most.  
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Figure 16.  Training Tasks Chosen for Four Deployment Scenarios 
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The data, as shown in Figure 16, beg the question, do SF soldiers believe that 
what has always been trained on for prior missions will be what needs to be trained on to 
prepare for all missions? It can be suggested that indeed, this is the case. The 
organizational culture seems to allow SF ODAs to fall back on the same training 
regardless of the mission.  
(6) Relationships and the Global SOF Network. The last subsection of 
questions shows the perception subjects have about the importance of long-term 
relationships with indigenous persons with whom they have contact during deployments. 
The testing of this perception is crucial to understanding the degree ODAs comprehend, 
accept and support the Global SOF Network and the likelihood that a commonly shared 
belief in the importance of the Global SOF Network will be widely shared in the 
Regiment. If it is not, SF’s contribution to the Global SOF Network may not be as robust 
as it could be.  
Responses in this subsection were mixed. While a majority of respondents (39 
percent) said they would devote one hour per month to stay in contact with indigenous 
persons whom they meet on deployments, a close second was those respondents who said 
they would only spend one hour per quarter staying on contact (33 percent). What the 
data does show, however is that the vast majority of respondents think this task is 
important enough to devote some time to as only 22 percent said they would only spend 
one hour per year on this task.  
The overwhelming majority of respondents (63 percent) were in agreement that 
the potential for future travel to visit their indigenous contacts would motivate them to 
spend more time and effort to maintaining contact. One of the most important facts about 
this particular question, however is that 17 percent of those surveyed wrote in a response 
when no open-ended, write-in answer was a choice. Those 17 percent said that they 
would gladly stay in contact with those they meet on deployments if the respondents’ 
security clearances would not be jeopardized by constant contact with foreigners.  
The analysis of this subsection shows that indeed there is widely shared value in 
gaining and maintaining contact with foreigners and SF soldiers would most likely see 
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not only utility in doing so, but would be easily motivated by continued deployments to 
strengthen these contacts. This boasts well for the future of the Global SOF Network and 
SF’s contributions to the advancement of it.  
c. Rewards and Desires 
This section identifies some aspects of training and deployments that are desirable 
to respondents and identifies reward systems that need to be altered to support the 
building of skills that will be required of SF during the execution of indirect operations. 
The questions and data analysis are important to understand some motivational factors 
that, if wielded properly, could assist in the building of organizational cultural traits that 
will enhance SF’s capability to succeed in future indirect operations. These questions are 
not an inclusive list training tasks or of motivators. However they are an important few 
that are critical for commanders to understand in order to begin changing the 
organizational culture to support more indirect operations.  
(1) Deployment and Motivation. The first subsection asks how long the 
subjects would like to be deployed to train with foreign partners, then asks if those 
deployments would motivate them to increase their language  
Figure 17 shows that the majority of responses, 81 percent, showed that they 
would like to deploy between four to six months per year to conduct training with foreign 
counterparts within their assigned AOR. More importantly, 96 percent of subjects said 
deploying for this amount of time for this reason would provide motivation for them to 
increase their language proficiency and cultural understanding.  
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Figure 17.  Rewards and Desires: Number of Months/Yr Subjects Would Like to 
Deploy to Train Foreign Partners 
This correlation seems to be fairly straightforward; however, most SF ODAs 
deploy for this length of time currently. What then is important to note are the responses 
to open-ended questions from previous sections. For previous questions pertaining to 
language training, many write-in answers suggested ODAs were not deploying to the 
countries or regions in which their assigned language is spoken, however, doing so would 
greatly motivate them to increase their capability in their assigned language.  
(2) Likelihood of Reward for Desirable Behavior. The next subsection ask 
subjects how likely they are to be rewarded by both the chain of command and fellow 
teammates for excelling at language proficiency. The last question in this subsection asks 
what type of reward from the Chain of Command would best motivate the subjects to 
increase their language capability.  
While a small minority of subjects responded that they were likely to receive 
reward from their Chain of Command the majority said they were not likely to be 
rewarded. Additionally, subjects responded that they were equally not likely to receive 
praise or reward from fellow teammates.  
This fact is crucial to understanding why motivation is low to attain better 
language capability at the ODA level. This skill has been identified in previous chapters 
as being absolutely necessary to not only conducting more successful indirect operations 
but also in building long-lasting partnerships. The survey shows, however, that there 
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suggest from this point that minimal emphasis has been given as well. This “shared 
norm” presents a downside of the current organizational culture within Special Forces.  
The final question in this subsection which asks what reward would be sufficient 
to motivate the subjects to increase their language capability. The majority of responses 
(52 percent) indicate that selection for the best deployments being based on language 
proficiency would motivate them the most to increase their capability. Selection for 
future duty assignments based on language proficiency received the second highest 
number of responses at 31 percent. These bold numbers suggest that the specific rewards 
that would motivate soldiers to increase their language capability are fairly 
straightforward and would not be hard for SF Groups to implement.  
Informal discussions with a former SF Group Commander suggest that some SF 
Groups are beginning to adopt language proficiency as a determining factor for selection 
of ODAs for the most coveted missions. However this selection criteria needs to be the 
norm in order to act as a strong motivator to alter the current organizational culture.  
(3) By, With, Through. The final subsection of the survey showed a positive 
aspect of SF’s organizational culture. A key aspect of organizational culture is how 
people feel about the jobs they do. A key component of SF soldiers’ jobs is their ability 
and desire to work by, with, and through indigenous personnel to successfully reach 
mission accomplishment. The final four questions ask how much enjoyment is received 
by working with the indigenous forces of their assigned AOR, being immersed in the 
cultures of their assigned AOR, learning about cultural differences from those in their 
AOR and the American culture, and the possibility of staying in touch with indigenous 
persons they have contact during deployments. In all four cases, the overwhelming 
majority of responses on the scale of 1–5 were either 4: “A good amount of enjoyment” 
or 5: “Great Enjoyment.” For each question, these two responses gathered over 80 
percent of the responses. This analysis shows that SF soldiers continue to be motivated, 
despite several of the other findings of this study, to be amongst the foreign cultures of 
their AOR and find great pleasure in working by, with, and through their counterparts. 
This shared norm may be the basis that upon which, the Special Forces Regiment may 
begin to repair the aspects of its organizational culture that are currently a hindrance.  
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E. FINAL THOUGHTS ON EMPIRICS  
Overall, the data analyzed suggests that while changes to the Regiment’s vision, 
goals, and objectives are acknowledged, those changes, and their intended ramifications 
on preparations for the future, are not fully understood at lower levels. More importantly, 
no simultaneous behavioral changes appear to be taking place at the ODA level to 
facilitate the achievement of the new goals and objectives. The organizational culture 
identified in this research is likely the cause for the lack of changed behaviors. It leans 
heavily toward a DA-focus and lacks adaptability. Therefore, it is likely that the current 
organizational culture of the SFGs will prevent them from attaining the highest levels of 
performance in future operations. The following chapter will provide recommendations 
for improving the organizational culture to help ensure this does not happen.  
  89 
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This research suggests that many aspects of the organizational culture of the 
Special Forces Regiment may require change, as the overarching culture may be 
adversely affecting SF’s ability to be effective in achieving its goals. Chief among the 
issues at the SFG level of analysis is a lack of SF soldiers’ understanding of the SFGs’ 
vision, goals, and strategies of employing the forces to accomplish the objectives. 
Additionally, there is a lack of understanding of the role SF plays in the larger DOD and 
Interagency approach to a whole of government solution to increasing national security. 
The organizational culture at the ODA level of analysis is also hindering the building of 
skills that will prove vital for mission accomplishment in the future operating 
environment. While a shift in mission focus is acknowledged by the ODAs, the beliefs, 
norms, and collective actions necessary to refocus training to meet the new objectives is 
not being altered. This chapter will summarize the findings of the data analyzed in 
Chapter III and will provide recommendations for action to correct the deficiencies in 
SF’s organizational culture as well as recommendations for further research.  
B. SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
A summary of the results from the data analysis follow. Results will be presented 
in two sections; first by each DOCS trait from the most troublesome aspect (Mission) to 
the most beneficial (Involvement), then by the three sections from the supplemental 
questionnaire, Future Mission and Direction, Training and Rewards and Desires. What 
follows will allow the reader to understand the most pressing issues discovered in this 
study and pave the way for a discussion of recommendations.  
1. Denison Organizational Culture Survey Results 
a. Mission 
The results from the DOCS represent the condition of the organizational culture 
of the SF Regiment. Overall those in the Regiment do not have a clear understanding of 
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the organization’s vision and strategies to reach its goals. This is an interesting finding 
because the vision and strategy is clearly outlined by USASOC. Regardless of the 
uncertainty with which SF operates, there still should be widespread understanding of the 
basic, overarching mission, purpose, and commander’s intent down to the lowest 
subordinate. This lack of understanding is possibly the biggest issue found regarding the 
Regiment’s organizational culture as these key pieces of information drive everything the 
unit does. Due to a lack of clear understanding of the vision, goals, and strategies of the 
SFGs there also exists no clear linkage between the daily activities the ODAs conduct 
(planning, training, and execution) and the SFG’s goals. As soldiers do not understand 
where their activities fit in the larger mission and purpose of their respective SFGs the 
ODAs cannot adequately nest their training programs to support the higher headquarters 
objectives.  
b. Adaptability 
Surprisingly, SF’s culture is not as adaptable as it may well need to be. 
Additionally, those in the Regiment may not understand what the larger U.S. Army and 
Interagency requirements are or what their relationships to SF are. This aspect of SF’s 
culture must improve if SF is to cooperate more effectively with interagency partners or 
integrate fully with U.S. Army conventional forces to foster greater achievement of 
national security goals. Since these are objectives of USASOC, this trend corresponds to 
the above discussion on a lack of understanding of higher headquarters’ vision, goals, and 
strategies. What appears to diminish SF’s adaptability is the inability of the SF Groups to 
share information and work across different parts of the organization. Without effective 
sharing of information and communication of lessons learned, the SFGs and the ODAs 
within them, will not be as effective during employment as they would be had they 
learned the lessons of their sister units. SF soldiers also find it hard to coordinate and 
work across parts of the SFG. Overall, SF has room for improvement in the way it 
understands and deals with its external environment and how it handles cross-Group 
interactions and knowledge sharing.  
  91 
c. Consistency 
A more positive aspect of SF’s organizational culture is that members of the 
organization feel there is strong set of values in place that foster agreement on how to 
operate. SF soldiers also have great faith and respect for their leadership. This bodes well 
for any organizational change initiatives instituted by leaders because data shows if the 
leaders make the changes and communicate the reasons why to the men, those changes 
will be widely accepted.  
d. Involvement 
The strongest trait of the SF organizational culture is the shared feeling that the 
Regiment has selected, trained, and equipped the best men for the job and has provided 
enough autonomy to the ODAs to accomplish the tasks they are given. This is the 
bedrock of SF’s organizational culture. This strong trait is a sense of pride for SF soldiers 
and must be retained during the implementation of any cultural change programs. Many 
of the recommendations that follow will lean on this strength to ensure overall culture 
change is implemented and accepted.  
2. Supplemental Questionnaire Results 
Overall analysis from the supplemental questionnaire shows that SF soldiers are 
more motivated to train on the lethal skill sets over the non-lethal skills that will be 
required to a great degree in the future employment of SF. These additional questions are 
presented in the concluding section as they serve to illuminate paths for future research. 
The following summation will be broken down by the three sections of the supplemental 
questionnaire.  
a. Future Mission and Direction 
SF soldiers understand the need for a shift in mission focus from direct 
application of forces to a more indirect role. However, this change is not being translated 
into action. This may be a case of confusion about what the future holds and how the 
training at the ODA will lead to increased effectiveness during future operations. This 
would follow the lack of understanding about the vision, goals and objectives described 
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above. However, it is also likely that the organizational culture, as we will see below, is 
one that does not foster change in the patterns of preparation – namely, planning and 
training.  
b. Training 
Overall, training time is spent on the skill sets most desired by the ODA: 
marksmanship and CQB. Language and cultural awareness are trained much less though 
the importance of these skills is widely agreed upon. Additionally, there is no consensus 
found by this research in perceptions about what skills will be most useful in the future. 
As discussed above, this is most likely due to a lack of understanding about the vision for 
the future within the SFGs. The trends show that SF soldiers tend to fall back on 
whatever training they feel comfortable doing or whatever they have done for previous 
deployments regardless of if new deployments will be similar at all to the prior ones. This 
aspect of the organizational culture at the ODA level has obvious negative impacts on 
readiness. The absence of knowledge about the future means ODAs will simply achieve 
the status quo. Undoubtedly each training event will be different; different venue or 
ranges, different manners for incorporating several tasks into one event, etc. However 
essentially, the ODAs will continue to train on the lethal skills over the non-lethal skills 
unless the organizational culture is adapted.  
c. Rewards and Desires 
SF soldiers are highly motivated to deploy to the countries within their AOR, 
remain for relatively long periods of time, and work by, with, and through their foreign 
partners. As the Involvement trait was the strongest and most positive aspect of the entire 
SF Organizational culture, so too is this trend the most positive aspect of culture at the 
ODA level. It is the bedrock on which SF is successful. This presents a bright spot for the 
future of SF. This widely shared norm will increase the likelihood of success of the 
Global SOF Network, and it will increase the effects of partnership with foreign units to 
increase America’s National Security.  
What is discouraging however is the lack of perception that reward, in any 
fashion, is not likely to be given for soldiers who excel at the very skills the Regiment 
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needs to develop the most (Clemmer, 2009). Without reward incentives, motivation to 
increase capability in non-lethal skills will never be as high as if a system (informal or 
formal) for reward was in place and visible to members of the SFGs.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Cultures are based on shared experiences and histories. To change an 
organization’s culture takes time, however change is possible. As circumstances change, 
people and the cultures of which they are a part, are forced to change. The circumstances 
under which all SFGs operate are changing. The members of those SFGs will change 
their behaviors and, after time, the behaviors will become commonplace and the 
underlying assumptions that will emerge will drive the actions and feelings of the SF 
soldiers. This will create a new organizational culture to help the Regiment adapt 
internally in order to deal with its external environment. In order to facilitate and 
accelerate this process, the following recommendations are made: an overarching strategy 
for change, recommendations for changing the overarching culture, and 
recommendations to change specific aspects of culture that prevent attaining the skills 
necessary for success.  
1. Overarching Strategy for Change 
The overarching strategy for long-term organizational culture change is based 
loosely on Schein’s dynamics of change concept (Schein, 1997). To ensure long-lasting 
organizational change, SFG leadership must adhere to the following three steps. This is 
an overarching concept to apply to any cultural change independent of the specific 
recommendations that follow.  
First, the leadership must create a motivation for members to change. To do those 
in the Regiment must be shown that their current behavior is not supportive of the goals 
of the organization. The Regiment then must be shown that its behavior is having (or will 
have) negative impacts on SF’s ability to be successful. Lastly the Regiment must be 
shown that there exists that ability to correct itself and align its behavior with the goals in 
order to achieve success.  
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Second, SFG leadership must institute the mechanisms for change that apply to 
their particular SFG. Some recommendations for change follow based on trends for all 
the SFGs together, however commanders must research the pitfalls specific to their 
organization’s culture and create a plan of action for addressing change to better ensure 
acceptability amongst the members of their SFG. Additionally, the SFGs must track their 
cultural change progress with the same scrutiny they would any other important program.  
Last SFGs need to reinforce and solidify the changed behaviors. To do this the 
SFG must show its soldiers that their new behaviors are having a positive effect on the 
unit’s performance. Rewards and recognition will play a key role in this final step as will 
clear and widespread communication.  
As stated previously, the above is an overarching concept for organizational 
culture change. Again, it is important to highlight that this concept is necessary to adhere 
to in order to ensure long-term success of cultural change initiatives. Specific 
recommendations for change based on the findings of this research follow. Those 
recommendations will be presented in two parts; recommendations for overall culture 
change for the SFGs and recommendations for change to ODA-specific aspects of the 
identified organizational culture.  
2. Recommendations to Address SF’s Culture at the Group Level 
The following recommendations are given in their order to priority of importance. 
In summary, the most important suggestions are clear communication, ensuring long-
term change, and coach and mentor subordinates.  
a. Communicate Effectively 
The most important recommendation based on the findings of this research is that 
the vision, goals and objectives of USASOC and the SFGs needs to clearly be 
communicated to the members of the Regiment. Communicating is not enough, however, 
SF’s leadership must ensure that the lowest levels understand how their day-to-day 
behaviors and actions contribute to the overall accomplishment of these goals and 
objectives. Each member of an ODA must understand how his short term goals, such as a 
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successful FID mission, help achieve the long term goals of the Regiment at large. 
Clearly explaining this link and the link to SF’s political, strategic, operational, and 
tactical performance will ensure motivation is high for ODAs to prepare in order to be 
successful as possible. SF is currently beginning to ensure that each of its ODAs’ 
deployments is nested into a higher SOF or COCOM’s objectives. This information must 
be impressed upon the ODAs and it is the responsibility of leaders in the SFG to ensure 
the ODAs clearly understand it prior to preparing for the mission.  
b. Encourage Long-Term Cultural Change 
To ensure long-term progress of organizational culture change, it is imperative the 
SFG leadership have continuity amongst subsequent command teams. Leaders rotate 
frequently and many of the strides made to change the culture may not come to fruition if 
incoming leaders do not continue the programs of change. To address this issue, 
commanders need to make organizational change programs formal and highlight these 
programs in continuity briefs to their replacements.  
SF’s organizational culture has many positive traits that must be leaned on to help 
change the negative aspects of the culture. While areas such as refocusing training efforts 
on language expertise and cultural awareness need more emphasis from leaders, other 
strong aspects of the culture must not lose strength. For example, micromanaging training 
schedules may achieve the desired behavior regarding training priorities, however this 
would decrease the strength SF’s culture has in the autonomy of its ODAs and their 
ability to operate on their own. That autonomy is central to success for the organization 
as a whole. Instead, leaders must develop methods of providing emphasis on behaviors 
they want to see changed, allow ODAs the opportunity to change and monitor their 
progress adding course corrections where necessary. To further highlight this point, 
discussion will follow on recommendations for mentoring and providing greater personal 
interaction between commanders and junior leaders.  
Long-term change of the culture is also dependent on continued selection and 
indoctrination of SF recruits. In the beginning is the best time and place to teach the 
soldiers how to act and what is important for success. The Special Forces Selection and 
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Assessment Course (SFAS) continually adapts to test and select recruits who possess 
those attributes most desired by the Regiment. It must continue to do so. Also, the 
recruitment process needs to expose potential recruits to what SF really is and what 
missions it will conduct in the future. As the empirical data showed, many of the current 
members of the Regiment joined because they thought SF would do direct action 
operations a majority of the time. While this may have been the case in the past, it will 
not be in the future. SF must communicate to its recruiting pool the realities of future SF 
operations then recruit and select those that are the best fit for the future goals of the 
organization.  
c. Mentor, Educate, and Cast a Wide Net 
In order to educate and more effectively communicate goals and guidance SFG 
Commanders must provide more personalized leadership and mentoring to their 
subordinates, specifically ODA commanders. SFGs should regularly gather all available 
officers together for discussion groups with the SFG Commander in order for him to have 
a venue to clearly communicate his vision, goals and objectives as well as address any 
questions from the ODAs to clear up any misunderstandings. This process relates to the 
recommendation for effective communication above. This information is too important to 
the building of a strong organizational culture to be simply passed down the chain of 
command. As any who have served as commanders at any level will know, things get lost 
in translation from a commander to subordinates and this has a trickle-down effect. 
Additionally, SF Battalion (BN) Commanders must continue to counsel and mentor their 
ODA commanders. However the focus of these sessions should concern the performance 
of the ODA in its progress of changing behaviors to fit the desired organizational culture. 
Strong BN leadership will know the strengths and weaknesses of the ODAs and will be 
able to monitor their progress and be able to provide feedback to ODA leaders during this 
process to ensure progress is made. 
ODAs don’t know what they don’t know. Education is key to the process of 
organizational culture change. As described above in the overarching strategy for change, 
ODAs must be told what they are doing wrong and the negative impact that behavior has 
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on the objectives of the SFG. However, this is only the first step. Leadership must 
educate junior members of the organization on “what right looks like.” More importantly 
though, is leadership teaching ODAs why they must adopt new behaviors. While this 
may be easy for many in the Regiment to intuitively figure out, ensuring clear and unified 
understanding through teaching will foster the building of underlying assumptions of how 
to operate and why operating that way is important. These assumptions will lead to a 
stronger organizational culture that will provide a more positive impact on the unit’s 
performance.  
SFG and BN leadership must also manage its talent across their units in order to 
put the right soldiers in the right positions to foster cultural change. The most effective 
NCOs and officers will be the ones who have adopted the desired behaviors and foster 
the desired organizational culture amongst those within their span of control. These 
soldiers can be moved to other parts of the organization where behavior needs refocusing 
and organizational culture is not supporting the unit’s goals. Empowering these specified 
leaders to change the culture of their new subordinate units will provide a wider change 
throughout the organization. 
3. Recommendations Specific to ODAs Building Necessary Skillsets  
a. Operational Detachment Bravo (ODB) Responsibilities  
The ODBs will have great responsibility in changing the organizational culture at 
the ODA level. Their efforts will be critical in changing perceptions, assumptions, and 
behaviors to ensure ODAs acquire the skills necessary for success in future indirect 
operations. Firstly, ODBs are responsible for providing guidance, direction, emphasis, 
and resources for training. As ODBs require training plans and schedules from ODAs 
they must manage the desires of the ODA-shown to be focused on lethal skills-with the 
requirements for mission preparation-non-lethal skills. As the ODBs are more intimately 
aware of the ODAs strengths and weaknesses it is their responsibility to act as a forcing 
mechanism to change behaviors. This sort of approach will only work to change behavior 
in the short term It will not have lasting effect on the role organizational culture plays in 
determining behavior unless the ODBs educate their subordinates on what the acceptable 
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behaviors are and reinforce this learning regularly. To do this, ODBs need to ensure their 
ODAs understand why non-lethal skills are just as, if not more, important to train as 
lethal skills in order for the ODAs to help the SFG reach its goals. Also, as most ODB 
Commanders are recent ILE graduates, they will have a greater understanding of the 
operational and strategic role SF operations play in achieving national security objectives. 
They must impart this wisdom on their subordinate leaders in order to show them how 
their day-to-day activities link to higher level end states. By teaching their subordinates, 
the ODAs will more fully understand their roles and be more willing to change their 
behaviors to align themselves more fully with the SFG’s needs.  
b. Collective Training 
ODA collective training must focus on the various skills necessary to succeed in 
indirect operations. This will benefit the ODAs twofold. First, if the ODB or BN 
Commanders plan the training events far enough in advance, focus those events on the 
non-lethal skills, communicate the focus of the event, and give adequate time for the 
ODAs to prepare then the collective training (and the associated pre-event, ODA 
training) will act as a forcing function to ensure ODAs are training the non-lethal skills. 
As stated above however, forcing functions cannot work to change the culture on their 
own. However if collective training events are frequent in number and focus on the non-
lethal skills, over time the importance of the non-lethal skills will be emphasized and 
accepted by the ODAs. Secondly, the ODB or BN can evaluate the performance of the 
ODAs in acquiring the non-lethal skills and provide mentoring, rewards, and 
punishments to promote the desired behavior which will further the changes to the 
organizational culture.  
The SFGs have already begun placing more emphasis on UW-focused collective 
training because it trains and evaluates all the skills an ODA will need for UW 
deployments as well as those needed for FID deployments. As stated previously, FID 
deployments are the most likely and USASOC has stated that UW capabilities need to be 
increased. However, if these UW training events incorporate role players speaking only 
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the languages assigned to the ODAs undergoing the training then, as above, ODAs will 
be forced to increase their language capability prior to the event.  
Once behavioral change has started to take place the desired behaviors must be 
rewarded. Positive reward systems are crucial in ensuring long term cultural change. This 
does not mean everyone who scores highly on their language aptitude test should receive 
a military medal. However it does mean that recognition of success in the areas of 
training that need emphasis will serve to promote the values the unit is trying to instill 
amongst its members. From the empirical research, the most coveted 
missions/deployments, selection for exciting duty positions, and opportunities for foreign 
cultural emersion are widely respected and sought after rewards. From informal 
discussions with a former SFG Commander, many of the SFGs are already instituting a 
form of reward where language aptitude is a deciding factor in determining which ODAs 
are assigned choice missions. Additionally, negative reinforcement is used when ODAs 
are not fully mission capable due to a lack of language capability. Both of these are 
excellent places to start. As for assignments based on language proficiency, it is 
important to note that this reward will only achieve the outcome of greater language 
aptitude if the requirement for language proficiency is communicated early to those who 
may desire such a position. Voicing this requirement early will provide great motivation 
for those who seek the desired position.  
Public praise is a method of reward that not only rewards the individual, but 
communicates to a wider audience the behaviors the SFG wants to promote and gives 
some incentive to do so. This reward does not need to be given out during full dress 
formations or other large gatherings. SF soldiers by their nature do not desire this kind of 
public praise and doing so may have the opposite effect. However a commander simply 
coming into a team room unannounced to tell an ODA member job well done in front of 
his ODA would be public rewards enough.  
4. Recommendations for Further Research  
As stated previously this study is based only on a cluster sample and although 
interpretations about the entire Regiment were deducted from the data, a more 
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representative study needs to be conducted concerning both the condition of SF’s overall 
organizational culture and of its effects on readiness for future operations. In conducting 
this research, it is imperative that the study gathers data from each SFG and from all 
ranks therein. Additionally, data from this study must be analyzed in depth, broken down 
by the subject’s rank, BN, and time in SF. These data sets may show differing trends and 
provide a more accurate picture of the SF organizational culture, its subcultures, and be 
able to provide more nuanced recommendations for change.  
Additionally, further research must be conducted on the best practices for reward 
and punishment systems meant to foster desired behaviors from ODAs. The 
implementation of findings from such a study would significantly help SFGs alter their 
organizational culture. Also research in this vein would provide commanders with a 
greater understanding of the tools at their disposal to better motivate their men and 
encourage change for the better.  
Research into marketing campaigns may provide insight into how SF can better 
promote their special warfare brand, not only to new recruits but also to political, CF and 
interagency leaders as well. Instituting the lessons learned from such research would 
ensure recruits are knowledgeable about special warfare, are accepting of those missions 
as the primary missions of SF, and ensure they are motivated to conduct those activities 
long before they join the ranks. Increasing awareness of SW, its purpose and effects, to 
politicians can serve to garner political support that may make SF, conducting SW, to be 
the first course of action thought of when security challenges arise. Increasing the 
knowledge of the role SF plays in SW and increasing the belief in its merits amongst both 
CF and interagency will serve to foster greater supporting relationships during the 
conduct of these operations; which will ultimately lead to greater effect achieved towards 
the end state of the operations.  
D. FINAL THOUGHTS 
Special Forces are, and will remain, a potent weapon in America’s arsenal for 
meeting the challenge of irregular warfare. They will continue to train, fight, and win 
wherever ordered to go and whatever ordered to do. This fact has been proved time and 
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again since the inception of the unit. However, having an organizational culture that 
supports the mission is a vital component and a necessary condition for better 
performance. To summarize this research, in order to tweak the organizational culture, SF 
needs to do one thing: make desired norms and behaviors “sexy.” SF soldiers always 
want the newest gear, the coolest weapons and gadgets, the best looking uniforms, etc. 
They want to go to the training venues that offer the most challenging ranges or will 
result in the best bragging rights. Soldiers use the term, “sexy” to describe these new, 
exciting, and coveted aspects of “SF life.” Any organizational cultural change is easy if 
the SF Soldier perceives the desired behaviors as sexy. If that can be done, and it is no 
small feat, the organizational culture will sort itself out and SF will be as effective as it 
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APPENDIX A. DENISON ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE SURVEY 
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APPENDIX B. SUPPLEMENTAL QUESTIONS 
BIOGRAPHICAL DATA:  
1. Age:__________ 
2. Rank:__________ 
3. Years in the Army:__________ 
4. Years in Special Forces:__________ 
5. What was your former SF Group:__________ 
6. Years on an ODA:__________ 
7. Years in your former SF Group:__________ 
8. Assigned language:__________ 
9. Language capability score:__________ 
10. Number of combat deployments:__________ 
11. Number of deployments other than combat (ex. JCS, JCET, MLE):__________ 
12. Are you currently preparing for an upcoming COMBAT deployment in the next 6 
months?: (Circle One): Yes  No 
13. Are you currently preparing for a non-combat deployment in the next 6 months? 
(Circle One): Yes  No 
14. Are you currently a member of the 4th BN? (Circle One): Yes No 
15. Did you spend time in a position at your SF Group other than Detachment 
Commander? (Circle One): Yes  No 
16. If you answered “yes” to question 14, how many months did you spend outside 
of an ODA? __________months. 
17. Were you a member of the Commander’s In-extremis Force (CIF) (Circle One) 
Yes  No 
18. If you were a member of the CIF, was this a command in addition to a regular 
ODA? (Circle One): Yes  No 
19. How many months ago did you leave your SF Group?__________months 
20. How many months ago did you leave your former ODA?__________months
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NOTE: For the following questions, please answer them based on your observations 
during your time at a Special Forces Group. This thesis research is interested in your 
opinions and knowledge specifically from that time period. What you have learned 
or perceived after your time at group is less important to the findings of this 
empirical research.  
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FUTURE MISSIONS AND DIRECTION OF ARMY SPECIAL FORCES: 
 
1. Do you believe your SF unit (BN or GRP) is changing their mission focus? If so, to 
which of the following missions do you believe your unit is moving toward?  
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER: 
A: More FID focused 
B: More UW focused 
C: More DA focused 
D: I do not believe my unit is changing mission focus. 
E: Other (Fill in the blank) 
 
 
2. On a scale of 1-5 how strongly do you believe the current or future operating 
environment requires the above change in mission focus?  
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER: 
 1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree.  
1=Strongly 
Disagree 
2 3 4 5=Strongly 
Agree 
 
3. Regardless of your answers to the above questions, what would be your primary 
motivation to strongly support a change in mission focus within your SF Group?  
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER: 
A: In depth discussion with command elements on the reasons for a shift in mission 
focus and its utility for SF 
B: Promotion based on acceptance and support of the decision to change mission 
focus 
C: Strong direction from ODA or ODB leadership 
D: Peer pressure from team members 
E: Exciting opportunities for duty positions based on the changed mission 
F: Other (Fill in the blank) 
 
 
4. Which one of the following missions do you believe you, or SF Soldiers under your 
command, will most likely undertake the most in the next decade?  
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER: 
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5. Given a choice from the following scenarios, which mission would you chose to 
conduct because it gives you the most fulfillment? CIRCLE ONE ANSWER: 
A: FID mission in your AOR not tied directly to wartime 
B: FID mission in your AOR where your partner force will undoubtedly conduct 
combat operations (after you leave) 
C: FID mission in your AOR where you can combat advise (advise during the 
execution of the combat operations undertaken by your partner force) 
D: Direct Combat operations (SR, DA, HR) unilaterally 
E: Direct Combat Operations with a partner force, however SF is in the lead. 
F: Low visibility, Advanced Special Operations 
  
6. Given a choice from the following scenarios, which mission DO YOU BELIEVE A 
MAJORITY OF MEMBERS OF YOUR FORMER ODA would have chosen to conduct 
because it would have given them the most fulfillment? CIRCLE ONE ANSWER:  
A: FID mission in your AOR not tied directly to wartime 
B: FID mission in your AOR where your partner force will undoubtedly conduct 
combat operations (after you leave) 
C: FID mission in your AOR where you can combat advise (advise during the 
execution of the combat operations undertaken by your partner force) 
D: Direct Combat operations (SR, DA, HR) unilaterally 
E: Direct Combat Operations with a partner force, however SF is in the lead. 
F: Low visibility, Advanced Special Operations 
 
7. Does the motto, “De Oppresso Liber” typify the missions you have conducted 
during your time in SF?  
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER: 




8. Does the motto, “De Oppresso Liber” accurately describe the missions you believe 
you will be conducting in the next decade in SF?  
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER: 
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9. Do you see any utility for SF to have Soldiers like you maintain contact with 
indigenous persons (military or civilian) with whom you have contact on a 
deployment?  
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER: 





















10. In your professional opinion, should SF conduct more direct action operations or 
more indirect action operations?  
*Direct Action Operations: “Short-duration strikes and other small-scale actions 
conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive 
environments and which employ specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, 
capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets.,” (Source: JP3-05)  
*Indirect Action Operations: “This approach usually includes actions taken to enable 
GCTN partners to conduct operations against terrorists and their organizations as well as 
actions taken to shape and stabilize their operational environments as a means to erode 
the capabilities of terrorist organizations and degrade their ability to acquire support and 
sanctuary. The indirect approach includes use of the SOF core activities such as FID, 
SFA, IO, MISO, and CAO.” (Source: JP3-05) Including UW.  
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER: 
A: Direct B: Indirect 
 
11. Do you believe a majority of the members of your former ODA would say SF should 
conduct more direct action operations or more indirect action operations? 
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER: 
A: Direct B: Indirect 
 
12. In your opinion, did the majority of members of your ODB perceive a change in 
mission from DA focused to UW/FID focus?  
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER: 
A: No, no one understood 
B: Some understood a change was coming 
C: I don’t know 
D: A majority of my ODB believed there was a change in mission 
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13. Regardless of your answer above, did you see a change in attitude and the way your 
ODB did business as a whole in order to prepare and adapt to a change in mission? 
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER: 
A: No, no one changed at all 
B: There was minimal change 
C: I don’t know 
D: A majority of my ODB changed how they were doing business 
E: Yes my ODB changed and adapted their way of doing business and their attitudes 
 
14. In your opinion, what percentage of your former ODA teammates were motivated to 
join Special Forces because they primarily wanted to conduct Direct Action operations 
and they believed SF would conduct DA a majority of the time?  
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER: 
A: 0% B: 25% C: 50% D: 75% E: 100% 
 
 
15. What percentage of your former ODA teammates retired from the army or left 
Special Forces because they did not believe they were doing enough Direct Action 
operations?  
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER: 
A: 0% B: 25% C: 50% D: 75% E: 100% 
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AREAS OF TRAINING EMPHASIS: 
1. How many weeks per quarter (12 weeks/quarter) did your ODA spend on 
weapons training or maintenance?  
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER: 
A: None B: Less than 1 C: between 1-3 D: between 4-8 E: more than 8 
 
2: Are you satisfied with the number of weeks per quarter your ODA conducted 
weapons training or maintenance?  
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER: 
A: Yes, I am satisfied 
B: No, we spend too much time on this training 
C: No, we need to spend more time on this training 
 
3: What prevented you from spending more team training time on weapons 
training?  
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER: 
A: Language training 
B: Individual schools 
C: Team schools 
D: Admin duties 
E: We are at an acceptable level of weapons proficiency on the team 
F: Other (fill in the blank): 
 
4. How many weeks per quarter (12 weeks/quarter) did your ODA spend 
conducting Small Unit Tactics (SUT) training?  
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER: 
A: None B: Less than 1 C: between 1-3 D: between 4-8 E: more than 8 
 
5: Are you satisfied with the number of weeks per quarter your ODA conducted 
Small Unit Tactics (SUT) training?  
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER: 
A: Yes, I am satisfied 
B: No, we spend too much time on this training 
C: No, we need to spend more time on this training 
 
6: What prevented your ODA from spending more team training time on Small Unit 
Tactics (SUT)?  
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER: 
A: Language training 
B: Individual schools 
C: Team schools 
D: Admin duties 
E: We are at an acceptable level of Small Unit Tactics on the team 
F: Other (fill in the blank): 
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7. How many weeks per quarter (12 weeks/quarter) did your ODA spend on 
language training, as part of team training? 
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER: 
A: None B: Less than 1 C: between 1-3 D: between 4-8 E: more than 8 
 
8: Are you satisfied with the number of weeks per quarter your ODA conducted 
language training?  
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER: 
A: Yes, I am satisfied 
B: No, we spend too much time on this training 
C: No, we need to spend more time on this training 
 
9: What prevented your ODA from spending more team training time on language 
training?  
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER: 
A: Range time 
B: Individual schools 
C: Team schools 
D: Admin duties 
E: We are at an acceptable level of language proficiency on the team 
F: Other (fill in the blank): 
 
10. How many hours per week did you spend personal time to develop your 
language skills?  
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER: 
A: Less than 2 B: 2-4 C: 4-8 D: 8-12 E: greater than 12 
 
11: What prevented you from spending more personal time on developing your 
language proficiency?  
Fill in the blank: 
 
 
12: What would have motivated you to spend more of your personal time on 
developing your language proficiency during your time at the SF Group?  
Fill in the blank: 
 
 
13. How many hours per week did your ODA spend on enhancing cultural 
understanding of a culture from your assigned AOR?  
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER: 
A: Less than 2 B: 2-4 C: 4-8 D: 8-12 E: greater than 12 
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14: Are you satisfied with the number of hours per week your ODA conducted 
training to enhance your cultural understanding of cultures in your assigned AOR? 
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER: 
A: Yes, I am satisfied 
B: No, we spend too much time on this training 
C: No, we need to spend more time on this training 
 
15: What prevented you from spending more team training time on enhancing your 
cultural understanding?  
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER: 
A: Range time 
B: Individual schools 
C: Team schools 
D: Admin duties 
E: We are at an acceptable level of cultural knowledge on the team 
F: Other (fill in the blank): 
 
16. How many hours per week did you devote personal time to enhancing your 
cultural understanding of cultures within your assigned AOR? 
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER: 
A: Less than 2 B: 2-4 C: 4-8 D: 8-12 E: greater than 12 
 
17: What prevented you from spending more personal time on enhancing your 
cultural understanding of cultures within your assigned AOR?  




18. How many weeks per quarter (12 weeks/quarter) did your ODA conduct CQB? 
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER: 
A: None B: Less than 1 C: between 1-3 D: between 4-8 E: more than 8 
 
19: Are you satisfied with the number of weeks per quarter your ODA conducted 
CQB training?  
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER: 
A: Yes, I am satisfied 
B: No, we spend too much time on this training 
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20: What prevented you from spending more team training time on CQB?  
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER: 
A: Language/Cultural training 
B: Individual schools 
C: Team schools 
D: Admin duties 
E: We are at an acceptable level of CQB on the team 
F: Other (fill in the blank): 
 
21. Though several training tasks are important, what is the one area you believe 
your ODA needed to focus training on THE MOST to be successful in future 
missions?  
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER: 
A: Cultural awareness B: Small Unit Tactics C: ASOT 
D: Instructor training E: Diplomacy F: CQB 
G: Language proficiency H: Marksmanship I: Interpersonal 
communication 
techniques 
J: Other (Fill in the blank): 
 
 
22. Based on the answer you provided for the above question, why did you select 
that answer?  
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER: 
A: My team was deficient in this task compared to the rest 
B: This task was what I believed would be most useful in upcoming deployments 
C: I believed this task will be used most in the upcoming decade of SF utilization 
D: Other (fill in the blank) 
 
23: Which of the following training tasks carried the most importance with your 
BN/Group command?  
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER: 
A:Cultural awareness B:CQB C:marksmanship 
D:Small Unit Tactics E:ASOT F:instructor training 
G:Language proficiency H:diplomacy I: interpersonal communication 
techniques 
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24. How closely did you follow your Group and BN (and possibly CO) CDR’s training 
guidance?  
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER: 
A: Never B: less than 
50% of the 
time 
C: 50% of 
the time 
D: more 
than 50% of 
the time 
E: Always F: I did not know 
what my CDR’s 
guidance was 
25: How strictly was your CDR’s guidance on training enforced?  
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER: 
A: Never B: Sometimes C: I don’t know D: Most of the time E: Always 
 
For the following questions, assume you, as an ODA Commander, had been given 
only the location of your deployment, the type of operations you will conduct (FID, 
Combat, UW, or CNT), and that you HAVE ONLY ONE WEEK to train (all other load 
out/admin tasks are complete) for the deployment. Additionally, please answer the 
following questions based on your perception of what the majority of your ODA 
teammates’ opinions would be to the scenarios presented: 
 
 
26: Given one week of training prior to a FID deployment, what training would a 
majority of your ODA members have liked to have seen conducted most? 
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER: 
A: Marksmanship B: Cultural Awareness 
training 
C: Advanced Urban 
Combat (CQB), 
D: Advanced driving E: Combatives F: Small Unit Tactics 
G: Other (fill in the blank): 
 
 
27: Given one week of training prior to a Combat deployment (Afghanistan), what 
training would a majority of your ODA members have liked to have seen conducted 
most? 
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER: 
A: Marksmanship B: Cultural Awareness 
training 
C: Advanced Urban 
Combat (CQB), 
D: Advanced driving E: Combatives F: Small Unit Tactics 
G: Other (fill in the blank): 
 
 
28: Given one week of training prior to a UW deployment, what training would a 
majority of your ODA members have liked to have seen conducted most?  
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER: 
A: Marksmanship B: Cultural Awareness 
training 
C: Advanced Urban 
Combat (CQB), 
D: Advanced driving E: Combatives F: Small Unit Tactics 
G: Other (fill in the blank): 
  116 
 
29: Given one week of training prior to a Counter-Narcoterrorism (CNT) 
deployment, what training would a majority of your ODA members have liked to 
have seen conducted most? 
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER: 
A: Marksmanship B: Cultural Awareness 
training 
C: Advanced Urban 
Combat (CQB), 
D: Advanced driving E: Combatives F: Small Unit Tactics 
G: Other (fill in the blank): 
 
  
30. Realistically, how much time would you have devoted to staying in contact with 
indigenous persons (military or civilian) with whom you had contact on a 
deployment by phone, email, or letters?  
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER: 
A: 1 hour/week B: 1 hour/month C: 1 hour per quarter D: 1 hour per year 
 
31: What would have motivated you to spend more time staying in contact with 
indigenous persons with whom you had contact during a deployment?  
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER: 
A: A monitored system that would be tied to performance evaluations 
B: Potential for future travel to visit your indigenous contacts 
C: Recognition and reward from COC 
D: Recognition and praise from fellow team members 
E: Specialty pays based on performance at maintaining contact 
  117 
REWARDS AND DESIRES:  
 
1. Given Peacetime operations, how many months per year would you have liked to 
deploy to a foreign country to conduct training with partner forces? 
ANSWERS: CIRCLE ONE ANSWER; 1-12 months 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
 
2. On a scale from 1-5 how much would the above opportunity have motivated you 
to increase your language proficiency and cultural knowledge? 
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER: 
1=not 












3. How likely were you to be rewarded by the chain of command for excelling at 
your language (not to include US Army pay incentives for language proficiency). 
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER: 
No chance of 
reward 
Not likely Moderately 
likely 
Likely Highly likely to 
be rewarded 
 
4. What type of reward from your Chain of Command would have motivated you the 
most to increase your language proficiency?  
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER: 
A: Military award (ex ARCOM) 
B: Selection for best deployments based on language proficiency 
C: Promotion tied to language proficiency 
D: Selection for future duty assignments based on language proficiency 
E: Other (fill in the blank) 
 
5. How likely were you to be rewarded by teammates for excelling at your language? 
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER: 
No chance of 
reward 
Not likely Moderately 
likely 
Likely Highly likely to 
be rewarded 
 
6. How much did you enjoy working with the indigenous forces in your assigned 
AOR?  














  118 
 7. How much did you enjoy being immersed in the culture(s) of your assigned AOR? 











8. Did you enjoy learning about cultural differences between the American culture 
and those of your assigned AOR? 











9. Would you have enjoyed staying in touch with indigenous persons (military or 
civilian) with whom you have contact on a deployment?  
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